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DUE PROCESS AND CRIMINAL





Jurisprudential maxims and constitutional principles demand that
no crime be defined except by law.' Both the ancient maxim of nullum
rinen sine lege and the constitutional requirements of due process re-
quire precisely drafted criminal laws in order to avoid the arbitrary in-
terpretation of the law by judge and jury and to permit citizens to
behave in conformity with the requirements of the law.2 Despite these
demands, certain statutes continue to regulate economic activities by
broadly defining criminal acts. The broad design of these statutes en-
ables the regulators to proscribe a variety of acts which threaten the
proper functioning of the economic order, yet are incapable of specific
proscription.3 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934,4 provisions of
which are designed to proscribe the use of fraudulent schemes in the
purchase or sale of securities, typifies such a statute. The drafters of
these provisions adopted broad language applicable to any fraudulent
securities activity in order to reach the unanticipated schemes of clever
investors. When the drafters made a wilfull violation of these provisions
a crime under the Act,5 they undermined the principles ofjurisprudence
I See Gordon, Crimes without Laws?, 11 JUR. REV. 214 (1966) (discussing the principle of
nullum crinen sine lege, or "no crime without law"). Gordon finds the importance of nullum
crimen in "its corollary that the criminal law should be clearly defined and certain, so that
arbitrary imposition of punishment is avoided, and citizens may be able to ascertain whether
their proposed behavior is criminal." Id. at 214.
2 Id. at 214-15.
3 See genera/y Kadish, Ciminal Sanctions for Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 423,
427 (1962).
4 15 U.S.C. § 77a, et. seq. (1976).
5 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1976).
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implicit in the constitutional demand for a definite and certain criminal
law. Moreover, the courts' subsequent expansion of the scope of these
provisions in criminal cases has further strained demands for certainty
in the criminal law. Criminal liability for insider trading, which was
created through expansive statutory interpretations in civil cases, is an
example of the inappropriate and potentially unconstitutional extension
of these antifraud provisions.
This comment discusses whether criminal prosecution of insider
trading under Rule lOb-5 is constitutionally defective. First, the histori-
cal development of the crime of insider trading is analyzed by focusing
on the relevant antifraud provisions and their judicial interpretation.
Second, the due process requirement of notice and its relation to the
crime of insider trading are discussed. This notice requirement eventu-
ally led to an attack, on grounds at vagueness, of Rule 10b-5. Third,
therefore, this comment will consider the early cases that dealt with the
problem of notice and Rule lOb-5 in any criminal context. The analysis
will focus on the crime of insider trading and the answers to the vague-
ness attack given by the Second Circuit6 and by the Supreme Court 7 in
the Chiarella cases. Fourth, the courts' use of Rule lOb-5 to criminalize
insider trading is compared to the analytical approach adopted by an
English court in Shaw v. Director ofPublic Prosecutions.8 Fifth, the practical
problems encountered with criminal prosecutions under Rule lOb-5 for
insider trading are discussed. This final section will focus on the general
inefficiency and inappropriateness of the criminal sanction in the at-
tempt to control insider trading through Rule lOb-5.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRIME OF INSIDER TRADING
The federal regulatory effort to eliminate fraud in securities trans-
actions began with the adoption of the Securities Act of 19339 and its
three main antifraud provisions, sections 11,10 12(2), 11 and 17(a). 12 The
6 United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
7 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
8 [1961] 2 All E.R. 446.
9 15 U.S.C. § 77a el. seq. (1976).
10 17 U.S.C. § 77k (1976). Section 11 provides civil liabilities for the inclusion of an un-
true statement of material fact in any part of the registration statement required under the
Act.
11 17 U.S.C. § 771 (1976). Section 12(2) provides civil liabilities for the sale or offer of a
security in connection with a prospectus or other communication containing an untrue state-
ment of material fact.
12 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). Section 17(a) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or.sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate com-
merce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
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end-product of the twenty volume Pecora Investigation, 13 these provi-
sions represent the initial federal response to the widespread fraud, most
evident in the omission of relevant information in the sale of worthless
securities to public investors.14 The adoption of the Securities Exchange
Act of 193415 extended these protections to securities traded on the na-
tional securities exchanges. The Act employed sections 10(b) and 16(b)
as its main tools to combat securities fraud. While section 16(b) is spe-
cifically drafted to reach "short-swing" insider trading,16 section 10(b) is
broader and more imprecise, proscribing manipulation in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.17 The general terms of section
10(b) embody the intent of Congress to promote fairness in securities
transactions. 18
Despite the breadth of its terms and intended purposes, section
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
13 Stock Exchange Practices." Hearings on S Res. 84 (72d Cong.) and S Res. 56 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1933-34).
14 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIEs LAW: FRAUD § 2.2 at 21 (1977). Professor Bromberg, a
noted scholar of Rule 10b-5, is the author of a four volume treatise on the Rule.
15 15 U.S.C. § 7 8a et. seq. (1976).
16 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1976). Section 16(b) provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been ob-
tained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the
issuer, any profit realized by him for any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of
any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within a period of
less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a
debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of
any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director or officer in entering into
such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security
sold for a period exceeding six months.
This section operates automatically to protect stockholders of a corporation against
shortswing (within the statutory six month period) speculation and trading by insiders hold-
ing nonpublic information. Congress deemed this protection necessary to protect aggrieved
stockholders from the inequities created by insiders, including directors, officers and principal
shareholders, who speculated in their corporation's stock without disclosing all information
relevant to their trading activity. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 135 F.2d 231, 235-236 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
17 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipula-
tive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
18 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1968).
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10(b) met little opposition during congressional debate. Out of almost
1,000 pages of transcripts of the House hearings, the combined refer-
ences to section 10(b) (at the time, section 9(c)) would barely fill a
page. 19 What little the record does provide clearly indicates that section
10(b) was designed to be expansive.20 One of the central figures in the
drafting of the Securities Exchange Act, Thomas G. Corcoran, ex-
plained that
Subsection (c) [referring to section 9(c), later section 10(b) in its final form]
says, "Thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices." Of course subsec-
tion (c) is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices[.] I do not
think there is any objection to that kind of a clause. The Commission
should have the authority to deal with new manipulative devices. 21
After Corcoran's testimony, and prior to its enactment as section 10(b),
the provision was broadened to include transactions in unlisted securi-
ties and encompass deceptive as well as manipulative devices.22 Thus,
the limited legislative history available indicates that unlike section
16(b), Congress did not, with section 10(b), specifically ban insider trad-
ing.23 Rather than enumerating the specific deceptive or manipulative
practices intended to be prohibited by section 10(b), Congress estab-
lished a flexible statute enabling the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) to use its rulemaking authority to reach unapproved
practices. 24
The SEC exercised this authority in 1942 by promulgating Rule X-
1OB-5, now Rule 10b-5. 25 Drafted and adopted in a period of economic
recovery, the Rule responded to market practices in which underpriced
securities were bought from unknowing stockholders by informed insid-
ers who reaped the benefit of future increases in the value of the stock.26
19 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 14, § 2.2(330) at 22.2.
20 Id., § 2.2(332) at 22.4.
21 Id. (quoting Stock Exchange Regulation, Hearings on H.k 7852 and HRt 8720 Before the
House Cormv on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (statement of
Thomas G. Corcoran)).
22 Id., § 2.2(232) at 22.4.
23 W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 19 (1968).
24 Id.
25 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). Rule lOb-5 now provides, in pertinent part, that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud.
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
26 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 14, § 2.2(420) at 22.8-.9. While the Rule was adopted at
least in part as a response to insider trading, there is no indication on the face of the rule that
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Until the adoption of this provision, the rules proscribing fraud in the
purchase of securities had applied only to brokers and dealers. By com-
bining the jurisdictional language of section 10(b) with the substantive
language of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act,27 Rule 10b-5 reached fraud
committed by "any person" in the "purchase or sale" of any security.28
As evidenced by the Commission's release issued contemporaneously
with the rule,29 10b-5 represented a deliberate effort by the SEC to
reach fraud by purchasers as well as fraud by sellers, 30 within the statu-
tory framework of section 10(b).
The reach of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has become even more
expansive through the course of judicial interpretation. The expansion
of these antifraud provisions through the judicial process occurred as a
result of less strict adherence to traditional canons of statutory construc-
tion3' and greater reliance on interpretation of congressional intent as
expressed in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Guided by the broad
congressional mandate to "insure the maintenance of fair and honest
markets in . . [securities] transactions, '32 the courts have modified the
common law standard of deceptive conduct to protect the interests of
it was meant to proscribe insider trading. While the SEC may have been "responding" to the
trading activity of insiders, this response was not translated into a specific regulatory prohibi-
tion of insider trading.
27 See note 12 supra.
28 W. PAINTER, supra note 23, at 20.
29 SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942): "The new rule closes a loophole in the protec-
tions against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or companies
from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase."
30 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 14, § 2.2(420) at 22.7.
31 The Supreme Court refused to accept the ancient canons of "eViudem generz " and "ex-
pressio unius est exciusio aterious" in an interpretation of section 2(1) of the Securities Act of
1933 in SEC v. Joiner Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). Section 2(1) of the Act defines the term
"security," specifically including under that definition fractional interests in oil and gas lease-
holds. Joiner presented the question of whether the maxim "exprssio unius est excusio alteins"
should be applied to exclude sales of nonfractional oil and gas leaseholds from the operation
of the Act, since such leaseholds were not expressly included in the definition of a security as
were fractional leaseholds. Replying to the argument that the doctrine of expressio unius must
apply, the Court observed that:
Some rules of statutory construction come down to us from sources that were hostile to
the legislative process itself and thought it generally wise to restrict the operation of the
act to its narrowest possible compass. However well these rules may serve at times to aid
in deciphering legislative intent, they have long been subordinated to the doctrine that
courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating general pur-
pose, will read text in the light of context and will interpret the text in so far as the
meaning of the words fairly permits so as to carry out in particular cases the generally
expressed legislative policy.
Id. at 350-51. The Court also refused to invoke the ejusdem generis rule to constrict the more
general term, in this case, "security," to the specific terms which follow. Id.
Professor Bromberg notes that the history of Rule lOb-5 is a "massive rejection" of the
doctrine of exprssio unius est exc/usio aleius. 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 14, at 27.
32 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1976).
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the investing public.3 3 In the past,3 4 the Supreme Court pursued this
purpose by broadly construing section 10(b), as it did in Supezntendent of
Insurance of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. 3 5 In that case, the
Court rejected a narrow reading of section 10(b) that did not protect a
defrauded corporate seller of Treasury bonds when the sale did not take
place through an organized securities exchange or through an organized
over-the-counter market. The Court held that the Act protected corpo-
rate as well as individual investors in transactions which were not con-
ducted over organized markets. In so holding, the Court declared that it
would "not read section 10(b) as narrowly as the Court of Appeals: it is
not 'limited to preserving the integrity of the securities markets' . . . ,
though that purpose is included. Section 10(b) must be read flexibly,
not technically and restrictively." 36
Such broad readings of section 10(b) transform the provision into a
device which applies to almost any scheme that interferes with the fair
and efficient operation of the securities market; whether or not that
scheme constitutes traditionally fraudulent activity.3 7 Traditional re-
33 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 854-55: "In an enforcement proceed-
ing for equitable or prophylactic relief, the common law standard of deceptive conduct has
been modified in the interests of broader protection for the investing public so that negligent
insider conduct has become unlawful."
34 In more recent years, the Coqrt has slowed the broadening of section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 liability, at least in its civil incarnations. As described by Harvey Pitt,
Rule lOb-5 has, for many years, served as a foundation for an aggressive enforcement
program under the federal securities laws by both the Commission and private litigants.
Prior to 1975, the rule had been interpreted broadly to encompass both novel and a
typical [sic] situations as well as garden variety securities frauds. Although the rule con-
tinues to possess considerable vitality, there can be little question that recent Supreme
Court decisions have significantly curtailed the responsiveness with which the judiciary
previously viewed Rule 10b-5. . . . The apparent intent of the Supreme Court to re-
duce the flexibility of Rule lOb-5 and to introduce a greater degree of certainty as to the
coverage of the rule is not likely to be accomplished in the absence of further Supreme
Court interpretation ...
Pitt, Rule lOb-5" Another Year of Continued Confusion, in 12 SEC '79, 85, 103 (H. Selagman ed.
1979). However, earlier civil interpretations of the Rule which greatly expanded its substan-
tive scope are still intact after the recent Supreme Court decisions, and these interpretations
continue to be applied, without reservation, in the criminal context. In no sense can these
recent developments be characterized as a substantive narrowing of the Rule.
In 1975, the Court, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975),
limited private actions under lb-5 to a purchaser or seller of securities. In 1976, the Court,
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), held that in a civil damage action under
lOb-5 a showing of scienter was necessary to recovery. Most recently, in 1980, the Court, in
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), held that a § 10(b) duty to disclose does not
arise from mere possession of nonpublic market information.
35 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
36 Id. at 12.
37 Professor Bromberg observes that "the courts and the SEC interpret the Rule so loosely
that it [the "fraud" prohibited by Rule 10b-5] is closer to unfairness than to what either
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quirements such as reliance38 and financial motive3 9 have been aban-
doned in favor of a more flexible approach. 40 Only recently has the
requirement of breach of a legal or equitable duty been revitalized. 4t It
is true that each scheme to defraud might present a new form of decep-
tion in a setting that does not fit neatly into traditional categories of
deceptive conduct. This problem, however, is not unique to fraud in the
context of securities transactions. The typical state statute providing
criminal sanctions for deceptive practices is considerably more definite
lawyers or laymen usually think of as fraud." 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 14, § 1.1 at 5
(footnotes omitted).
That the statute embodies a concept of fairness rather than fraud appears in an interpre-
tation offered by the Seventh Circuit in Kohler v. Kohler Co., 399 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir.
1963): "The statute and the rule basically call for fair play and abstention on the part of
the corporate insider from taking advantage of the uninformed outsider or minority
stockholder."
38 The requirement of reliance was abandoned by the Court in favor of the concept of
materiality, at least in private damage suits. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128 (1972). The Court held that:
(u)nder the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose, positive
proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts
withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them
important in the making of this decision. . . . This obligation to disclose and the with-
holding of a material fact establish the requisite element of causation in fact.
Id. at 154.
39 Professor Bromberg notes that "(a) 10b-5 transgression can occur without economic
motive or purpose." 3 A. BROMBERO, supra note 14, § 8.4(554) at 204.201 (citing SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 862). Bromberg goes on to note that "even in a criminal
case, motive is not essential," citing United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 808-810 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970) id. In Simon, the criminal convictions of accountants
who had certified misleading financial statements were upheld even though the court found
no personal financial motivation or other "ordinary commercial motivation."
40 This flexible approach and its departure from the traditional concept of fraud were
adopted in Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963):
It is clear that the statute was intended to create a form of fiduciary relationship between
so-called corporate "insiders" and "outsiders" with whom they deal in company securi-
ties which places upon the insider duties more exacting than mere abstention from what
is generally thought to be fraudulent practices. If so, the question arises: What are the
limits of those duties? We are satisfied that the answer cannot be confined to an abstract
rule but must be fashioned case by case as particular facts dictate.
Id. at 637.
41 The Court resurrected and revitalized the concept of duty when it held in Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, that there could be no fraud under lOb-5 absent a duty to
disclose:
Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be
fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud
absent a duty to speak. We hold that a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from
the mere possession of nonpublic market information.
Id. at 234-35. Thus, when the Court notes in dicta that "what it [§ 10(b)] catches must be
fraud," it is simply reaffirming the role of the traditional duty of disclosure associated with
one in a fiduciary or confidential relationship. In this limited context, the Court did not hold
that all the traditional requirements of common law fraud must be met in a Rule lOb-5
prosecution.
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and narrow in scope than is Rule lOb-5.42 Thus, while the states reach
deceptive conduct with narrowly drafted statutes,43 the federal courts
42 For a typical criminal deceptive practices statute, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 17-1
(1979):
§ 17-1. Deceptive practices. (A) As used in this Section...
(iii) To act with the "intent to defraud" means to act wilfully, and with the spe-
cific intent to deceive or cheat, for the purpose of causing financial loss to another, or to
bring some financial gain to oneself. It is not necessary to establish that any person was
actually defrauded or deceived.
(B) General Deception
A person commits a deceptive practice when, with intent to defraud:
(a) He causes another, by deception or threat to execute a document
disposing of property or a document by which a pecuniary obligation is incurred, or
(b) Being an officer, manager or other person participating in the direction
of a financial institution, he knowingly receives or permits the receipt of a deposit or
other investment, knowing that the institution is insolvent, or
(c) He knowingly makes or directs another to make a false or deceptive
statement addressed to the public for the purpose of promoting the sale of property or
services, or
(d) With intent to obtain control over property or to pay for property, labor
or services of another he issues or delivers a check or other order upon a real or fictitious
depository for the payment of money, knowing that it will not be paid by the depository.
Failure to have sufficient funds or credit with the depository when the check or other
order is issued or delivered is prima facie evidence that the offender knows that it will not
be paid by the depository, and that he has the intent to defraud;
(C) Deception on a Bank or Other Financial Institution
False Statements
1) Any person who, with the intent to defraud, makes or causes to be made,
any false statement in writing in order to obtain an account with a bank or other
financial institution, or to obtain credit from a bank or other financial institution, know-
ing such writing to be false, and with the intent that it be relied upon, is guilty of a Class
A misdemeanor.
For purposes of this subsection (C), a false statement shall mean any false statement
representing identity, address, or employment, or the identity, address or employment of
any person, firm or corporation.
Possession of Stolen or Fraudulently Obtained Checks
2) Any person who possesses, with the intent to defraud, any check or order
for the payment of money, upon a real or fictitious account, without the consent of the
account holder, or the issuing financial institution, is guilty of a Class A
misdemeanor....
3) Possession of Implements of Check Fraud. Any person who possesses, with
the intent to defraud, and without the authority of the account holder or financial insti-
tution any check imprinter, signature imprinter, or "certified" stamp is guilty of a Class
A misdemeanor ...
Possession of Identification Card
4) Any person, who with the intent to defraud, possesses any check
guarantee card or key card or identification card for cash dispensing machines without
the authority of the account holder or financial institution, is guilty of a Class A
misdemeanor....
43 Professor Bromberg notes that "(a)lthough it is difficult to generalize because of local
variations, state fraud seems narrower than lOb-5 in most instances." 2 A. BROMBERG, supra
note 14, § 2.7(1) at 56 n.150 (new matter, at 390). The states have also been particularly
more successful than the SEC and Congress in proscribing insider trading with a narrowly
drafted statute. In particular, California has imposed a statutory duty on insiders to disclose
when trading on inside information:
It is unlawful for an issuer or any person who is an officer, director or controlling
person of an issuer or any other person whose relationship to the. issuer gives him access,
directly or indirectly, to material information about the issuer not generally available to
the public, to purchase or sell any security of the issuer in this state at a time when he
knows material information about the issuer gained from such relationship which would
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continue to expand the already broad language of 10b-5 to reach unan-
ticipated forms of deception.4 Thus, the antifraud provisions of the Ex-
change Act have developed, through expansive judicial interpretation,
into a means of policing the securities markets by reaching not only
traditional fraudulent activity, 45 but also by reaching a new class of
fraud which impacts the operation of the securities markets without nec-
essarily satisfying the elements of common law fraud.46
Consistent with this broad construction of the antifraud provisions,
the courts expanded Rule 10b-5, through continuous judicial interpreta-
tion in civil cases,4 7 to proscribe insider trading.4 The historical foun-
dation of this proscription was established by the SEC's interpretation of
significantly affect the market price of that security and which is not generally available
to the public, and which he knows is not intended to be so available, unless he has reason
to believe that the person selling to or buying from him is also in possession of the
information.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25402 (West 1977). This California provision has been incorporated in
the American Law Institute's proposed Federal Securities Code. ALI FED. SEaUrrIIEs CODE
§ 1603 (1980).
44 See, e.g., A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967):
[We do not] think it sound to dismiss a complaint merely because the alleged scheme
does not involve the type of fraud that 'is usually associated with the sale or purchase of
securities.' We believe that § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 prohibit all fraudulent schemes in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities, whether the artifices employed involve
a garden type variety of fraud, or present a unique form of deception. Novel or atypical
methods should not provide immunity from the securities laws.
45 That the language of section 10(b) encompasses more than simply common law fraud
was noted in Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961):
Section 10(b) speaks in terms of the use of "any manipulative device or contrivance" in
contravention of rules and regulations as might be prescribed by the commission. It
would have been difficult to frame the authority to prescribe regulations in broader
terms. Had Congress intended to limit this authority to regulations proscribing com-
mon-law fraud, it would probably have said so. We see no reason to go beyond the plain
meaning of the word "any," indicating that the use of manipulative or deceptive devices
or contrivances of whatever kind may be forbidden, to construe the statute as if it read
"any fraudulent" devices.
46 Many of these decisions fall to indicate just which common-law elements are dis-
pensed with. The Fifth Circuit has perhaps stated the greatest detail, sweeping it all
away: "(10b-5) greatly expands the protection frequently so hemmed in by the tradi-
tional concepts of common law misrepresentation and deceit, the requirement of privity,
proof of specific damage, inadequacy of the right of recission or right to recover up to par
value of stock of much greater value. To these difficulties would have to be added the
geographical obstacle of suit in a common forum against multi-state defendants scattered
as far as the fraudulent device required."
1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 14, § 2.7(1) at 55 n.150 (quoting Hooper v. Mountain States
Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961)). Cf SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) (The Court held that § 206
of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 is not limited to proscription of those acts or omissions
traditionally reached under common law fraud. "Fraud, indeed, in the sense of a court of
equity properly includes all acts, omissions and concealments which involve a breach of legal
or equitable duty, trust, or confidence, justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or by
which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another." .d.). Se also I A.
BROMBERG, supra note 14, § 2.7(l) at 55 n.1 (discussing SEC v. Capital Gains).
47 See W. PAINTER, supra note 23, at 21-22. Painter argues that it was only through an
evolutionary administrative and judicial expansion of lOb-5 that it became useful as a tool for
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Rule lOb-5 in WardLaFrance Truck Corporation,49 and by judicial applica-
tion of Rule 10b-5 to insider trading in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. ,o
and in Speed v. Transamerica Corp. 51 While these opinions are important
for historical purposes in tracing the substantive expansion of Rule 10b-
5 in the context of civil liability for insider trading, the SEC did not
establish that Rule lOb-5 would serve as the definitive prohibition of
insider trading until the decision of In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 5 2 This
proscribing trading by insiders who relied on confidential information in making their
purchases.
48 In general terms, insider trading refers to the practice of trading in a corporation's stock
by a corporate insider, usually, but not exclusively, a director or other officer, who has knowl-
edge of information likely to influence the value of the stock when made public.
49 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943). The SEC in Ward LaFrance applied the newly adopted 10b-5 to
reach a purchase by Ward LaFrance officers of the minority shareholders' interest in the
corporation. The officers purchased without disclosing recently increased earnings and with-
out revealing their intent to liquidate the corporation, Id. While holding that Rule 10b-5
applied to this transaction, WardLafrance did little more than include the common law "spe-
cial facts" doctrine of Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909), within the meaning of section
10(b)'s "deceptive device" language. See Manne, Insider Trading and the Administrative Process,
35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 473, 478 (1967). Professor Manne argues that, at the time, commen-
tators viewed WardLaFrance as an adoption of the "special facts" doctrine. This doctrine was
limited to those situations involving the most flagrant breaches of fiduciary duty in direct
purchases between insiders and investors, usually in the context of closely held corporations.
See W. PAINTER, supra note 23, at 17-18. For this reason, the doctrine was ineffective in
reaching insider trading involving publicly held and nationally traded shares. Id.
Professor Manne argues further that until 1947, there was no general rule against insider
trading, and cites SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943), as indirect authority for this
proposition. Manne, sura, at 478 n.43. Regardless of the validity of this analysis, it is appar-
ent that Ward LaFrance was merely the beginning of the subsequent growth of Rule lob-5.
50 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). The Kardon court held that section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 "apply to directors and officers who, in purchasing the stock of the corporation from
others, fail to disclose a fact coming to their knowledge by reason of their position which
would materially affect the judgement of the other party to the transaction." Id. at 800.
Thus, insiders, here defined to be directors and officers, were brought under the umbrella of
10b-5 civil liability when they failed to disclose material facts to the sellers of securities.
51 49 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951). The Speed court defined the duty imposed on corporate
insiders:
It is unlawful for an insider, such as a majority stockholder, to purchase the stock of~a
minority stockholder without disclosing material facts affecting the value of the stock,
known to the majority stockholder by virtue of his inside position but not known to the
selling minority stockholders, which information would have affected the judgement of
sellers.
Id. at 828-829.
While Speed may be limited to a situation involving a majority shareholder who
purchases, outside the organized security exchanges, the interest of the minority shareholders
in order to capture the value of the corporation's assets, the language of its holding went
beyond any previous interpretation of lob-5 and provided a basis for future expansive inter-
pretation in cases to follow. See 1 A. BROMBERG, sura note 14, § 3.2(300) at 65. In this
instance, however, the court viewed lOb-5 as "broadly remedial," and extended that rule to
provide liability within the limited context of a majority shareholder so purchasing the inter-
est of the minority. 49 F. Supp. at 829.
52 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). Cady, Roberts &Co. grew out of an action brought by the SEC to
discipline a partner of a registered broker-dealer firm for violations of section 10(b) and Rule
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landmark opinion, written by William Carey, then the Commissioner of
the SEC, imposed an obligation on insiders to disclose material informa-
tion or refrain from trading, even when there was no pre-existing fiduci-
ary relationship between the insider and the parties with whom he
traded.5 3 In establishing this obligation to the market, Commissioner
Carey relied on the broad, remedial provisions of the Securities Ex-
change Act; provisions unconstrained in his analysis by the narrower
and more technical variety of common law fraud. 54 Carey reiterated his
concern that the antifraud provisions be construed flexibly to reach mul-
tiple forms of deception which are incapable of specification before they
occur, but which must be proscribed if the SEC is to ensure a fair securi-
ties market.55
The growing proscription of insider trading through the expansion
of 10b-5 reached its zenith 56 in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 57 In Texas
Gu/f Sulphur,58 the Second Circuit declared the Cady Roberts & Co. rule,
IOb-5. The partner, acting on information received from a director of the corporation about
an impending dividend reduction, proceeded to sell shares in the corporation from discretion-
ary accounts of firm customers, knowing that the information had not yet been made public.
Imposing a 10b-5 duty to disclose to this broker, the Commission virtually assured that Rule
lOb-5 would serve as the definitive tool in an attack on all insider training, imposing an
obligation to disclose or refrain from trading regardless of any fiduciary relationship between
the parties involved.
53 Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements, first, the existence of a
relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available
only for a corporate purpose and not for the benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing. . . . [O]ur task here is to identify those
persons who are in a special relationship with a company and privy to its internal affairs,
and thereby suffer correlative duties in trading its securities.
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912 (footnotes omitted).
54 "Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5,
issued under that Section, are broad remedial provisions aimed at reaching misleading or
deceptive activities, whether or not they are precisely and technically sufficient to sustain a
common law action for fraud and deceit." Id. at 910 (footnotes omitted).
55 "These anti-fraud provisions are not intended as a specification of the particular acts or
practices which constitute fraud, but rather are designed to encompass the infinite variety of
devices by which undue advantage may be taken of investors or others." Id. at 911 (footnote
omitted).
56 Manne, supra note 49, at 474.
57 401 F.2d 833.
58 The Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation grew out of the massive Timmins ore find and the
subsequent trading by corporate insiders and others in the stock of Texas Gulf prior to the
public announcement of this find. After the first successful drill hole was completed by Texas
Gulf near Timmins, Ontario, in late 1963, and after it became clear that Texas Gulf had
made what was apparently one of the largest ore finds in history, the corporation undertook
tight security measures to prevent news of the find from leaking out. It was after this find and
after the institution of security measures that several officers, directors and employees of
Texas Gulf bought shares in the company or exercised stock options given by the company.
This practice was continued by these individuals until April 16, 1964, when the announce-
ment by Texas Gulf officials of this major ore find was made, and prices of the stock made
substantial advances. The SEC subsequently filed suit, asking for both injunctive and restitu-
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which proscribed trading by one who has "access, directly or indirectly,
to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose
and not for the personal benefit of anyone,"5 9 to be the "essence" 60 of
Rule 10b-5. In Texas Gulf, what had originated as a rule primarily
designed to prevent fraud by brokers and dealers became a device for
assuring "equal access to material information."'61 To implement this
policy of equal access, the court relied upon Cady, Roberts & Co. to de-
clare that not only are the traditional corporate insiders, management
and directors precluded from dealing on inside information, but that
anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to
the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to pro-
tect a corporate confidence, or if he chooses not to do so, must abstain from
trading in or recommending the securities while such inside information
remains undisclosed. 62
Having identified a duty owed to the open market by anyone in
possession of material inside information, the Texas Guff Sulphur court
then established a test for assessing when information was material. The
court found any fact to be material "which in reasonable and objective
contemplation might affect the value of the corporation's stock or securi-
ties." 63 Such facts, the court held, included not only information per-
taining to a corporation's earnings and distributions, but also those facts
which affect the "probable future of the company and those which may
affect the desire of investors to buy, sell, or hold the company's securi-
ties." 64 The court essentially offered a calculus of expected probabilities
that the possessor of inside information must properly evaluate in deter-
mining whether the information is such that Rule lOb-5 demands disclo-
tive relief, against the individuals and the corporation, alleging violations of Rule lOb-5
where the parties traded on material facts without disclosing such facts to the sellers of Texas
Gulf stock.
59 401 F.2d at 848 (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912).
60 Id. at 844.
61 Id. The Texas Gulf ulphur court referred to the general congressional purpose to insure
that all members of the investing public face identical market risks:
The core of Rule l0b-5 is the implementation of the Congressional purpose that all in-
vestors should have equal access to the rewards of participation in securities transactions.
It was the intent of Congress that all members of the investing public should be subject
to identical market risks,--which market risks include, of course the risk that one's evalu-
ative capacity or one's capital to put at risk may exceed another's capacity or capital.
Id. at 851-52.
62 Id. at 848 (emphasis added). The court made clear that it was expanding the tradi-
tional concept of a corporate insider with this statement: "[i]nsiders, as directors or manage-
ment are, of course, by this Rule, precluded from so unfairly dealing, but the Rule is also
applicable to one possessing the information who may not be strictly termed an 'insider'
within the meaning of Sec. 16(b) of the Act." Id. (citation omitted).




sure prior to trading.65 The court explicitly adopted this probabilistic
approach with this passage:
In each case, then, whether facts are material within Rule lOb-5 when the
facts relate to a particular event and are undisclosed by those persons who
are knowledgeable thereof will depend at any given time upon a balancing
of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the antici-
pated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company
activity.66
While courts that make the assessment of the magnitude of the particu-
lar event discounted by the probability that the event will occur operate
from a position of hindsight, the insider must follow this calculus with-
out the certainty that such hindsight provides.6 7 At best, then, the in-
sider 68 confronting the issue of lOb-5 liability is faced with a calculus of
uncertainties which become certainties only after he has made his deci-
sion to trade or to refrain from trading.69
Placing the insider in a position of uncertainty with respect to his
liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 may be an acceptable ap-
65 Professor Bromberg criticizes this test of materiality, arguing that the result, "in view of
the way market professionals and short term traders sometimes react to relatively slight bits of
information--seems to be to set a regrettably low threshold of materiality." 2 A. BROMBERG,
supra note 14, § 7.4(3)(c) at 168.4.
66 401 F.2d at 849.
67 Professor Bromberg discusses the problems with the Texas Gulf test and its reliance
upon hindsight in assessing materiality:
The court does not refine the probability factor any further; we cannot tell whether it has
in mind odds better than 50-50 or 75-25, or something else. A probability approach
realistically simulates much investor judgement, which is probabilistic in some degree.
But the court gives no indication of the relevant odds and creates a test which will be
difficult to apply fairly and which lends itself easily to distortion by hindsight, in one
direction if the event does in fact occur, and in opposite direction if it does not.
2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 14, § 7.4(3)(f) at 169.
Professor Bromberg prefers a rule of thumb which would measure materiality "in terms
of probable effect on security prices. A predicted shift of a few percentage points seems non-
material for most stocks; 20% would be material for nearly any security." Id., § 7.4(3)(c) at
168.6. The advantage of such an approach, according to Bromberg, "would be to give com-
panies and insiders a better basis for judging when they have material information, when they
should release it, and when it is safe for them to trade." Id.
68 The insider not only may have difficulty determining when information is material, he
also may have difficulty determining whether or not he is in fact an "insider" subject to the
Rule. The ambiguity of this passage from Bromberg illustrates the problem:
People have been agonizing for years over the question, "Who is an insider?" The an-
swer is not to be found in organizational charts or other well-defined relationships. It is
to be found in "access" and "unfairness,". . . . (T)he crucial criterion is "access." This
means something more than possession of the information, but how much more is not yet
clear. Probably it means possession intended to fulfill a corporate purpose [of the com-
pany to which the information relates].
Id., § 7.4(6)(b) at 180 (footnotes omitted).
69 The difficulty of making the decision while confronted with the uncertainties and pres-
sures of an active market is noted by Professor Bromberg, who states that "[i]t is hard enough
for a lawyer, let alone a businessman, to fix the point of materiality while caught up in the
flow of events." Id., § 7.4(6)(c) at 186.
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proach with regard to civil liability for violations of the Rule. The lower
federal courts and Congress have declared that the disruption of fair
and efficient operation of the securities market, caused by insider trad-
ing on concealed information, is a significant problem.70 In such a situa-
tion, where an efficient market is threatened,7' and where the insider
always has the option of not trading,72 it may be appropriate to place
the risk of erroneous guessing on the insider. 73 Thus, when the insider
engages in market activity that is potentially disruptive, he takes the risk
that the courts or the Commission will find his activity disruptive under
Rule 10b-5.
When both civil remedies and criminal sanctions are authorized
under the same statutes,74 the enforcement of that statute can present
constitutional difficulties, as illustrated in the remainder of this com-
ment. Violation of either section 10(b) or Rule lOb-5 subjects the viola-
tor not only to civil sanction, but may also be a crime under section
70 The Texas GulfSulohur court, quoting H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1934), stated:
The idea of a free and open public market is built upon the theory that competing
judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair price of a security brings about a situation
where the market price reflects as nearly as possible a just price. Just as artificial manip-
ulation tends to upset the function of an open market, so the hiding and secreting of
important information obstructs the operation of the markets as indices of real value.
401 F.2d at 858.
71 Much of the literature critical of the development of Rule lOb-5 as a prohibition on
insider trading argues that insider trading creates significant economic benefits and in fact
contributes to the efficiency of the market by insuring more rapid dissemination of informa-
tion. See, e.g., H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Ruder, Pifalls
in the Development of a Federal Law of Corporations by Implication Through Rule lob-5, 59 Nw. U.L.
REV. 185, 208-214 (1964). Professor Bromberg notes, however, that none of the arguments
advanced by these authors strikes an economist as very probable. The weight of authority as
well as the weight of economic theory rests with those who argue that the economic harm
caused by insider trading outweighs any of the incidental benefits which might accompany
that trading. See 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 14, § 7.4(6)(b) at 179 n.166.
72 Professor Bromberg notes:
Much of the rhetoric about 10b-5 in the open market has proceeded as if there were only
two choices for the person with inside information: to reveal it or to violate the Rule.
Since revealing it may injure the corporation . . . and be beyond the scope of the in-
sider's authority . . . , the conclusion follows that 10b-5 cannot require disclosure.
Apart from the difficult balancing of individual, corporate and market elements inherent
in such an argument, it ignores the third alternative: not to trade. The last course will
often be the safest and most conservative one for the insider, and it is doubtful that either
he or the economy will suffer from it, for only short periods-weeks or days, sometimes
just hours--are usually involved.
2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 14, § 7.4(6)(a) at 178 (footnote omitted).
73 The court in Texas GulfSulhur placed the burden of guessing wrong upon the insider
by establishing that "(e)ven if insiders were in fact ignorant of the broad scope of the Rule
and acted pursuant to a mistaken belief as to the applicable law such an ignorance does not
insulate them from the consequences of their acts." 401 F.2d at 852 n.15.
74 Cf United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435-39 (1978) (Sherman
Act authorizes both civil remedies and criminal sanctions with regard to the same generalized
definitions of the conduct proscribed.) I
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32(a), the penalty provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.75
While the number of reported criminal cases involving criminal viola-
tions of 10b-5 is not large,76 the criminal sanction is all too frequently
employed in conjunction with Rule lOb-5. The problems that repeat-
edly appear within the limited number of reported criminal lOb-5 cases,
particularly in those cases involving insider trading, merit a closer anal-
ysis than has been provided in the past.77 Ironically, such an analysis is
critically important today because both an SEC commissioner 78 and the
75 Section 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1976), provides, in pertinent part, the following:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter. . . , or any rule or
regulation thereunder the violation of which is made unlawful or the observance of
which is required under the terms of this chapter, . . . shall upon conviction be fined
not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, except that
when such person is an exchange, a fine not exceeding $500,000 may be imposed; but no
person shall be subject to imprisonment under this section for the violation of any rule or
regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation.
76 Professor Loss provides the most extensive collection of lOb-5 criminal cases to 1961,
noting that there is little point in collecting those beyond 1961, due to the high number that
produced no opinions, usually due to guilty pleas:
United States v. Griswold, 5 SEC Jud. Dec. 305 (N.D. Ohio 1947) (conviction based on
outsider's acquiring liquor company's shares principally from innkeepers by falsely repre-
senting that they were worthless after exercise of the purchase rights granted by issuer to
buy its whiskey inventory); United States v. Rubrecht, Litig. Rel. 366, 5 SEC Jud. Dec.
181, 15 SEC Ann. Rep. 253 (W.D. Pa. 1947) (motion to dismiss indictment denied);
United States v. Turner, Litig. Rels. 418, 427 (W.D. Wis. 1947); United States v. Taylor,
Litig. Rels. 364, 491 (N.D. Ill. 1949); United States v. Waddy, Litig. Rel. 504, 545 (W.D.
Ark. 1949); United States v. Hancock, Litig. Rel. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (involved a
scheme whereby an employee of a company which was trustee, sponsor and investment
adviser for certain investment funds defrauded the funds by informing a broker-dealer
firm and a securities trader of the trustee's plans to buy or sell securities for the portfolios
of the funds, so that they could "get ahead" of the trustee in the market); United States
v. Davis, Litig. Rels. 568, 587 (W.D. Mo. 1950); United States v. Herald, Litig. Rels. 531,
594 (N.D. Ill. 1950); United States v. Luck, Litig. Rels. 541, 637 (S.D. Fla. 1951); United
States v. Swift, Litig. Rels. 805, 827 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (dissemination of false information
to newspapers); United States v. Martin, Litig. Rel. 832 (D.N.M. 1954); United States v.
Smith, Litig. Rel. 2058 (N.D. Ala. 1961); United States v. Bales, Litig. Rel. 2075 (W.D.
Ky. 1961).
3 L. Loss, SECURrIEs REGULATION 1449 n.15 (2d ed. 1961 & 1969 Supp. at 3559).
77 Herlands, Cn'mnzal Aspects of the Securities Exchange Act, 21 U. VA. L. REv. 139 (1934) is
still cited as a useful work discussing the criminal penalties associated with the Exchange Act.
Professor Bromberg refers to the criminal aspects of lob-5 as not "particularly extensive or
significant," and for that reason only "sketches" those aspects in his discussion. 4 A. BROM-
BERG, supra note 14, § 10.3 at 241.
78 In a recent interview with the Bureau of National Affairs, SEC Commissioner Barbara
S. Thomas noted that she would like to see Congress impose stricter penalties for insider
trading:
I think that the prospect of an SEC injunction, even when coupled with disgorgement of
illegal profits and payments of attorneys' fees, simply is not sufficient to deter certain
people from insider trading. They feel that if they are caught, they are not much worse
off than if they had passed up the opportunity altogether.
I am currently considering ways in which we can increase the deterrent effect of our
enforcement actions. Clearly, there ought to be more frequent use of criminal penalties
622 S.E.C. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) B-3, 4 (Sept. 30, 1981).
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director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement7 9 have indicated their
plans to apply criminal penalties more frequently in an effort to deter
insider trading. The central problem ignored in criminal prosecutions
of insider trading,80 but noted by Judge Kaufman in United States v. Per-
skV, 8' begins with "the apparent dissonance between the general rule
that criminal statutes are to be construed strictly in favor of the accused
* . . , and the realization that the civil incarnations of the antifraud
provisions have, as remedial legislation, been openly and avowedly con-
strued broadly .... "82 An adequate assessment of the significance of
this apparent dissonance begins with an analysis of the constitutional
demand for certainty in the criminal law.83
II. VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE TRADITIONAL
NOTION OF DUE PROCESS
To assure certainty in the criminal law, 4 the Supreme Court estab-
lished the void-for-vagueness doctrine. The doctrine is based upon the
precept that a criminal statute must be sufficiently definite so as to indi-
79 The Bureau of National Affairs made this report of John M. Fedders' first public re-
marks as Director of the Division of Enforcement at the SEC:
The Commission will "intensify its efforts to detect and prosecute" trading based on non-
public information, Fedders pledged. He (Fedders) said the Commission would "not shy
away from cases based on circumstantial evidence" if the facts demonstrated that "any
person breached a trust, confidence or other duty owed to another" by trading while in
possession of inside information.
624 S.E.C. REG. & REP. (BNA) A-5 (Oct. 14, 1981).
80 The dual nature of the Sherman Act, which also provides both civil and criminal sanc-
tions, has presented similar problems of interpretation for the courts. The problems were
discussed by the Supreme Court in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at
435-39:
The Sherman Act, unlike most traditional criminal statutes, does not, in clear and cate-
gorical terms, precisely identify the conduct which it proscribes. Both civil remedies and
criminal sanctions are authorized with regard to the same generalized definitions of the
conduct proscribed-restraints of trade or commerce and illegal monopolization-with-
out reference to or mention of intent or state of mind ...
The Act has not been interpreted as if it were primarily a criminal statute; it has
been construed to have a 'generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be
desireable in constitutional provisions.' Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288
U.S. 344, 359-360 (1933).
81 520 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975).
82 Id. at 287 (citations omitted).
83 Judge Sneed identified the inconsistency between the demands of the criminal law and
the application of 10b-5 in criminal prosecution: "neither section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), nor Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, are interpreted nar-
rowly when employed as a basis for criminal prosecution, even though a narrow
interpretation is ordinarily considered proper with respect to statutes defining crimes. .. ."
U.S. v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 355 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
This inconsistency will be discussed in detail in the remainder of this comment.
84 See H. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 93 (1968).
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cate what conduct is subject to a penalty.85 This doctrine developed
through interpretation of the fifth amendment due process requirement
during the era of substantive due process. 86 In this era, the vagueness
doctrine was a convenient vehicle for voiding various pieces of regula-
tory legislation. 7 Although a product of the era of substantive due pro-
cess, the vaguenes doctrine retains its vitality. Today, the Court usually
applies the doctrine in cases involving fundamental personal rights, par-
ticularly those enumerated in the first amendment, rather than in cases
involving economic regulatory legislation. 8
This concept of definiteness finds application in two criminal con-
texts. First, prior to any act by the potential criminal offender, definite-
ness demands that the criminal law give explicit notice and fair warning
sufficient to permit the potential offender to tailor his conduct to meet
the requirements of the statute.8 9 Second, at the trial of an accused,
definiteness demands that the criminal law provide sufficiently precise
standards to guide both court and jury in their determination of
whether the accused has in fact violated the statute.90 The resultant test
is the same in both contexts, however, since a statute which forbids the
doing of an act in terms so vague or uncertain that it fails to give a
person of ordinary intelligence notice that such an act is forbidden is
repugnant to the essential requirements of due process.91 The Court has
held that
it will not do to hold an average man to the peril of an indictment for the
unwise exercise of his. . . knowledge involving so many factors of varying
effect that neither the person to decide in advance nor the jury to try him
after the fact can safely and certainly judge the result.92
85 See Note, Due Process Requirements of Defiiteness in Statutes, 62 HARV. L. REv. 77, 78
(1948).
86 The doctrine was first mentioned by the Court in Ohio ex. rel. Lloyd v. Dollison, 194
U.S. 445, 450 (1904); it was first squarely recognized in Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas
(No. I), 212 U.S. 86, 108-11 (1909); and it was first invoked to invalidate a statute in
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914).
Id. at 77.
87 See Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n., 286 U.S. 210 (1932); Smith v. Ca-
hoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927); Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926); A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233
(1925); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
88 See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 74
n.38 (1960).
89 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), cited in
Note, The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, supra note 88, at 68 n.3.
90 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 151-52, 154 (1945) (Roberts, J., dissenting), citedin
Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, supra note 88, at 68 n.3.
91 Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163 (1972); United States v. Harriss,
347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 444, 453 (1939); Champlin Refin-
ing Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 242 (1931); Connally v.
General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
92 Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 465 (1927).
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Thus, in assessing a claim of statutory vagueness, 93 "the applicable test
is whether the language conveys 'sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practices.' . . . A statute violates due process if 'men of common intelli-
gence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.' -94
In practice, courts have not strictly applied the standard of "com-
mon intelligence" and have demanded less definiteness than what the
standard seems to require. 95 Generally, an individual is charged with
"such knowledge of a statute's meaning and applicability as he could
obtain through competent legal advice, provided that the statute gives
him enough warning that he ought reasonably to see the need for ob-
taining such advice."'96 Such a standard seems particularly appropriate
in the area of economic regulation, where a businessman will often at-
tempt to ascertain his legal rights and duties by consultation with an
attorney.97 When a criminal statute does not equip a competent attor-
ney to make sufficiently definite predictions of what conduct falls within
its proscriptive bounds, the statute fails to satisfy the due process re-
quirement of notice.98
Even this test, however, may be applied less strictly than its lan-
guage demands, particularly in the context of criminal proscription of
certain types of business behavior. While "[n]o one may be required at
peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal
statutes," 99 it is also true that because "there may be marginal cases in
93 Here, the relevant inquiry is one of the constitutional validity, in the context of a crimi-
nal prosecution, of a rule, Rule lOb-5, promulgated pursuant to a statute, section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act. In such a circumstance, the rule must meet the same standard of definiteness
required of the statute. Herlands, supra note 77, at 170. The central concern in this discus-
sion is not with the validity of the Rule as a product of delegation of administrative authority
under the Act. As distinguished by Herlands:
The propriety of delegating to administrative bodies the execution of policies and admin-
istrative functions defined by statute is well established. In determining the constitution-
ality of such grants of power, it has been said that "the issue is whether the statutory
standard is sufficiently definite for the administrative agency to carry out the legislative
will." And for such purposes "the precision of a criminal statute is not required." But a
criminal statute must clearly define the nature and the quality of the offense; otherwise it
may be declared unconstitutional for ambiguity and indefiniteness. There is logic in
holding that the same law may be invalid as a criminal statute but valid as a delegation
of administrative power.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
94 United States v. Schwartz, 454 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1972) (citations omitted).
95 Note, Due Process Requiremens of Defxiteness in Statutes, supra note 85, at 79.
96 Id. at 80.
97 Id. at 80 n.18.
98 Id. at 80.
99 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 444, 453 (1939). Lanwelta involved the constitutional-
ity of a criminal conviction under a New Jersey statute making it a crime to be a gangster. A
gangster was defined to be any person not engaged in a lawful occupation, known to be a
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which it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which a particu-
lar fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the language too
ambiguous to define a criminal offense."' 00 In cases in which the subject
matter limits the precision with which the legislature or the administra-
tive agency can identify the proscribed conduct, the court may uphold
the necessarily indefinite statute rather than find it unconstitutionally
vague and therefore void. l0 ' In the presence of such policy considera-
tions, the court may weigh the indefiniteness of the statute against the
economic and social value of maintaining the statute's proscription. 0 2
In general, public welfare or regulatory offenses do not invoke the same
demanding constitutional scrutiny applicable to other offenses.103 Thus,
a less stringent standard of impermissible vagueness will apply to the
rules promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act. To survive the
standard, the value of the rules as tools for insuring the fair and efficient
operation of the securities markets must outweigh the harm from lack of
notice caused by the indefiniteness of the rules.
Applying the vagueness analysis to test the facial validity10 4 of Rule
10b-5 as a criminal insider trading provision involves more than a sterile
application of void-for-vagueness jargon. The classic language of the
due process void-for-vagueness analysis is merely a catalogue of where
the Court has been in the past, rather than a prediction of where it will
go in the future. The traditional language of due process and the com-
mon law canons of statutory construction are axioms of experience
rather than rules of law, 10 5 and therefore can be invoked as support only
member of any gang consisting of two or more persons, and who had been convicted of any
crime. Id. at 452. The meaning of the word "gang" was held "so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." Id. at 453.
100 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947). Petrillo involved the constitutionality of
a criminal conviction under the Lea Act which made it a crime to compel a broadcaster to
employ persons in excess of the number that broadcaster actually needed. The Court upheld
the validity of the statute, arguing that the standard embodied as much exactness as the
subject matter permitted. See Note, Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, supra note
85, at 82-83.
lot See United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 ("the Constitution does not require impossible
standards"). See also text accompanying note 100 sup ra.
102 See Note, Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, sura note 85, at 83 (citing
United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1; Miller v. Strahl, 231 U.S. 426, 434; 1915 Baltimore &
Ohio R.R. v. ICC, 221 U.S. 612, 620 (1911)).
103 See United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d at 355 (Sneed, J., concurring). See also Kadish,
supra note 3, at 440-41.
104 Here, the use of the term "facial validity" does not mean that the validity of the Rule
as written is being tested. Rather, the test is one of the validity of the evolutionary court
construction of it as a rule to proscribe insider trading. Cf Note, The oid-for-Vagueness Doc-
trine and the Supreme Court, sura note 88, at 109 n.224 (multiple meanings assigned to the
language "attacking a statute on its face").
105 See Frankfurter, Some Refltetions on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 544
(1947).
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after the appropriate balancing of policy considerations has taken place.
Rule 10b-5 became a prohibition of insider trading through judicial ex-
pansion in civil cases where courts, relying on the remedial nature of the
Securities Exchange Act, attached broad meaning to the language of the
Rule. Whether these broad civil interpretations, when applied in crimi-
nal 10b-5 prosecutions, violate the dictates of due process, is a question
left unanswered by the traditional rhetoric. The search for an answer
and the proper analysis of policy considerations must begin by turning
to the handful of cases that have discussed the due process issue of notice
presented by a criminal prosecution under Rule 10b-5.
III. THE COURTS AND 10b-5: ANSWERING THE VOID-FOR-
VAGUENESS PROBLEM
United States v. Chamay s06 addressed the due process issue of notice in
the context of a criminal 10b-5 action. Charnay involved manipulation
and fraud associated with a corporate takeover bid, 0 7 rather than in-
sider trading. Finding this conduct proscribed by Rule 10b-5, the Ninth
Circuit substantially relied on civil cases 08 holding manipulative activ-
ity violative of Rule 10b-5.10 9 While the court recognized the potential
difficulty presented by the fact that "much of the case law on Rule 10b-
5 has. . . developed in civil rather than criminal litigation,"'" 0 it went
106 537 F.2d 341.
107 Chamay involved the conduct of Howard Hughes and his associates in the Hughes Tool
Company in the takeover of Air West, a Delaware corporation whose stock was listed and
traded on the American Stock Exchange. The defendant officials of Hughes Tool made an
offer on behalf of their corporation to acquire the assets of Air West at a price which would
yield $22 per share to Air West stockholders. On the day the takeover bid was approved by a
majority of the Air West stockholders, a majority of the Air West directors voted to reject the
offer. The government alleged in its indictment that the defendants threatened to file law
suits and threatened to dump large blocks of Air West stock on the market to artificially
depress its price in order to coerce the directors to change their votes. Apparently, these
manipulative activities did cause a decline in Air West stock from $18 per share to $15.75 per
share, in turn causing Air West's directors to reverse their position and accept the offer of
Hughes Tool. Id. at 344.
The indictment charged wilful violations of lob-5 in that the
defendants wilfully and knowingly employed a scheme to defraud, made untrue state-
ments of material facts and omitted material facts necessary to make the statements not
misleading, and used instruments of interstate commerce to accomplish their
scheme, . . . all of which operated as a fraud and deceit upon the purchasers and sellers
of Air West stock.
Id. at 345. This indictment was dismissed by the district court, which stated, with regard to
the alleged violations of Rule lOb-5, that the Rule is an antifraud provision and "does not
purport to define manipulative activity." Id. at 346. The court of appeals reversed.
108 The civil cases cited by the court include: Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507
F.2d 374,378-81 (2d Cir. 1974); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 792-
98 (2d Cir. 1969); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546-47 (2d Cir. 1967).
109 537 F.2d at 348.
110 Id. at 345.
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on to hold that "precedents established in civil cases interpreting Rule
lOb-5 are applicable in criminal prosecutions under the rule.""' De-
spite its recognition that there were "no cases at all involving the specific
conduct in which the (defendants) . . .are alleged to have engaged,"" 2
and that "none of the factual situations in the cases discussed . . . are
11 Id. In ruling that civil precedents under 1Ob-5 are applicable in criminal prosecutions,
the court first relied on SEC v. Joiner Corp., 320 U.S. at 355, which the court cited for the
proposition that "the primary difference between the crihainal and civil prosecutions under
the securities laws is the burden of proof required for a verdict." 537 F.2d at 348. However,
Joiner was a civil and not a criminal case, and the Court was simply noting that in a criminal
case, the evidence would have to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that nonfractional oil
and gas leaseholds are securities under the terms of the Securities Act. See note 31 supra and
note 129 in~fa, for further discussions ofJoiner. The Court did not indicate that the "primary"
difference between civil and criminal prosecutions under the securities laws is this burden of
proof requirement, nor did it establish that a civil precedent was directly applicable in a
criminal prosecution under the Act. ThatJoiner cannot be read as broadly as Chamay con-
tends is evident from the language in joiner upon which Chaony relied:
In the present case we do nothing to the words of the Act; we merely accept them. It
would be necessary in any case for any kind of relief to prove that documents being sold
were securities under the Act. In some cases it might be done by proving the document
itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond, or a share of stock. In others proof must
go outside the instrument itself as we do here. Where this proof is offered in a civil
action, as here, a preponderance of the evidence will establish the case; if it were offered
in a criminal case, it would have to meet the stricter requirement of satisfying the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.
SEC v. Joiner Corp., 320 U.S. at 355.
The Charnay court also relied upon United States v. Clark, 359 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), to support its argument that civil precedents are equally applicable in criminal lOb-5
prosecutions. The court wrote that "[a]s noted in United States v. Clark, 359 F. Supp. 128,
130 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), 'there is no reasonable basis for holding that some different interpreta-
tion (of Rule 10b-5) should apply in a criminal action' than in a civil action." 537 F.2d at 348
(parenthetical supplied by court). However, the language taken from Clark and relied on by
the Chamnay court does not stand for the general proposition that civil precedents must univer-
sally be applied in criminal lOb-5 actions. Again, the court's own language provides the
relevant context and illustrates its limited scope:
As a result of Texas Gulf and Heit (402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968)), the Court of Appeals for
this Circuit has announced its interpretation of the "in connection with" language of
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, and has applied that interpretation both in an S.E.C. injunctive
action and in private damage actions. In my view, there is no reasonable basis for hold-
ing that some different interpretation should apply to a criminal action.
United States v. Clark, 359 F. Supp. at 130.
Thus, Clark was merely applying civil precedent to determine the meaning of a specific
phrase in section 10(b), eventually adopting a meaning supported not only by previous civil
precedent, but also by the legislative history of the Act itself. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,
401 F.2d at 860 ("[I]t seems clear from the legislative purpose Congress expressed in the Act,
and the legislative history of Section 10(b) that Congress when it used the phrase . . . in-
tended only that the device . . .cause reasonable investors to rely thereon . . .and cause
them to purchase or sell a corporation's securities."), quoted in United States v. Clark, 359 F.
Supp. at 129-30. The importance of the language "in connection with" in defining the scope
of § 10(b) argues against any analysis which assumes that in adopting civil precedent with
respect to this phrase, the Clark court was endorsing wholesale use of civil precedents in crimi-
nal lOb-5 actions.
112 537 F.2d at 347.
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identical to that present here,"' "13 the court relied on these civil cases to
uphold the defendants' convictions. 1 4 Thus, without directly con-
fronting it, the Chamay court implicitly rejected the notice-due process
issue by applying a new standard of conduct, derived exclusively from
civil cases, to a criminal prosecution under lOb-5.
While the majority opinion in Chamay did not address the notice
issue, Judge Sneed raised serious questions as to the propriety of the
court's approach to Rule lOb-5 in criminal prosecutions in his concur-
ring opinion. 15 Judge Sneed first indicated that, as with statutes defin-
ing other "public welfare offenses," 16 neither section 10(b) nor Rule
lOb-5 is interpreted narrowly when employed in criminal prosecutions,
although criminal statutes are ordinarily interpreted narrowly. 117 With
regard to the specific facts of Chamay, Judge Sneed stated that the court
found
an indictable offense charged in the indictment despite the fact that there
exists no case, not even one imposing civil liability, in which substantially
similar facts have been treated as a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. These provisions have been applied herein to the conduct of de-
fendants no differently than they would have been in a civil action.'1
Despite the lack of any direct precedent, including any civil precedent,
the court permitted a criminal prosecution for violation of Rule lOb-5.
Such an approach, contrary to traditional vagueness analysis, is permit-
ted in the unique context of Rule lOb-5, as Judge Sneed indicates:
(I)n fixing criminal liability under section 10b-5, we attach reduced impor-
tance to assertions of vagueness. The fact that men of common intelli-
gence-or lawyers and judges for that matter-"must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application," does not require that we de-
clare this section 10(b) void for vagueness." 9
Rather than responding to the demands of due process for clear criminal
statutes, the courts, in applying section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in criminal
cases,
respond to stern and demanding fatalism reflected in Nash v. United States
"3 Id. at 349.
114 See cases cited in note 108 supra.
15 537 F.2d at 355 (Sneed, J., concurring).
116 See Sayre, ublic We/fare Ofenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55 (1933). Sayre defines public
welfare offenses to be the "group of police offenses and criminal nuisances [which are] punish-
able irrespective of the actor's state of mind. . . ." Id. at 56 n.5. Examples of such offenses
include crimes for the sale of adulterated or impure food and drugs, crimes for the violation of
traffic regulations and motor vehicle laws and crimes for the violation of most other police
regulations designed to promote the safety, health or morals of the community. Id. at 55, 72-
73. Most of these offenses are punishable irrespective of the intent of the actor. Id. at 55.
117 537 F.2d at 355-56 (Sneed, J., concurring).
118 Id. at 356.
119 Id. at 356-57 (footnotes omitted).
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"[T]he law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating
rightly, that is as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree.
If his judgment is wrong, not only may he incur a fine or a short imprison-
ment. ..; he may incur the penalty of death."'120
Thus, Charnay adopted a policy of ensuring fair and efficient mar-
kets 121 which operates to subordinate the traditional vagueness doctrine
to the needs of Rule lOb-5. It did so by extending the broad construc-
tions of the securities laws in civil cases to criminal prosecutions under
those laws. It is this policy, when applied to support a criminal prosecu-
tion under Rule 10b-5, that Judge Sneed finds particularly "dis-
turbing." 122  Adopting and promoting such a policy in lOb-5
prosecutions vests the court with a residual power to proscribe conduct
under the Rule never before found illegal by any court. 123
A similar approach to that applied in Chamay was adopted in United
States v. Perskey,124 where the defendant contended on appeal that sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 were unconstitutionally vague. In responding
to Perskey's contention that the broad civil interpretations of the Rule
had so expanded its scope as to provide insufficient warning of the sorts
of fraud proscribed under a standard of strict construction, 125 the court
replied that "[n]o honest and reasonable citizen could have difficulty in
understanding the meaning of 'untrue,' 'material fact,' 'any omission to
state a material fact,' . . . or 'misleading'. ."...,126 Despite the court's
confidence that any honest citizen knows the meaning of phrases such as
"material fact," Professor Bromberg 127 notes the serious difficulties en-
countered in determining when information is material and who is a
statutory insider.128 Yet, despite this difficulty in determining the mean-
ing of materiality in the context of Rule lOb-5, the Perskqy court did not
strictly construe the Rule in the criminal prosecution. 129 The court
120 Id. at 357 (quoting Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913)).
121 537 F.2d at 356.
122 Despite the traditional deference given to the vagueness doctrine in interpreting and in
applying criminal statutes, Judge Sneed accepted this policy and the existing authority
granted under lob-5 to ensure the fair operation of markets even where such acceptance
meant ignoring the traditional requirements of the vagueness doctrine, although finding "no
satisfaction or pleasure in doing so." Id. at 357.
123 Id.
124 520 F.2d 283.
125 Id. at 287.
126 Id. (quoting Coplin v. United States, 88 F.2d 652, 657 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 301 U.S.
703 (1937)).
127 See A. BROMBERG, ,upra note 14.
128 See notes 67-69 supra.
129 520 F.2d at 288. The rejection of a strict construction of the terms of Rule lOb-5 in a
criminal prosecution is puzzling given the early treatment accorded the Rule by the Supreme
Court in SEC v. Joiner Corporation, 320 U.S. 344. In this civil action under Rule lOb-5, the
defendants argued that the definition of security under the Securities Act of 1933 fell short of
encompassing the particular activity in which they engaged. The defendants argued that the
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found, moreover, that Perskey's conduct 130 would still have been "fraud-
ulent even under the most restrictive definition of 'common law
fraud,"' 131 and therefore would be proscribed under a strict reading of
Rule 10b-5. The court did not reject the vagueness argument for future
lOb-5 cases. It noted that Perskey could not attack Rtfle lOb-5 on
vagueness grounds because other conduct would be more ambiguous
under the Rule than Perskey's fraud. 132
In a more recent case involving section 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933, the Court answered a vagueness attack on section 17(a) as it was
applied in a criminal prosecution for fraud in the sale of securities. In
United States v. Na/lalin,133 the defendant Naftalin ordered various bro-
kers to sell shares which he did not own, hoping that the price of the
shares would fall before delivery.' 34 While the Eighth Circuit found
definition of security must be strictly construed as they were subject to potential criminal
liability under section 32(a) of the Act. The Court rejected this argument, stating in dicta
that:
though penal laws are to be construed strictly, they are not to be construed so strictly as
to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. The maxim is not to be so applied as to
narrow the words of the statute to the exclusion of cases which those words, in their
ordinary acceptation, or in that sense in which the legislature has obviously used them,
would comprehend.
Id. at 354 (quoting United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (1820)). The Court in Joiner
also found persuasive the fact that this was a civil case, not a criminal case, and whereas in
the civil action a preponderance of the evidence will establish that the transaction in question
involved a "security," the proof, if offered in a criminal case, would have to meet the stricter
requirement of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the transaction did involve a
security. Id. at 355. The higher degree of proof which would be required to prove that a
particular act involved a security permitted the Court, in this civil action, to adopt an inter-
pretation of the meaning of "security" which went beyond statutory language. The interpre-
tation was not created, however, in the criminal context, and the Court implies that such
post-hoc broadening of the statute would not have been permitted in the review of a criminal
conviction for the same conduct. TheJoiner Court's willingness to distinguish between the
scope of Rule lob-5 in civil actions and the scope of the same rule in criminal prosecutions
has not been accepted by'other courts, including Perskey, in their treatment of similar
problems.
130 Perskey, a securities lawyer, was convicted for violation of Rule lOb-5 in connection
with a series of false press releases issued and false statements made to stockholders of a corpo-
ration of which Perskey was an officer. Through a series of speculative transfers, the com-
pany's president, Kaplan, squandered some $375,000 of the corporation's assets. To cover
this indiscretion, Perskey proposed to arrange a merger whereby the corporation's assets and
liabilities would be assumed by the merger candidate. Toward this end, Perskey issued a
press release describing the proposed merger, misrepresenting in that release the existence of
the $375,000 as residual assets of the corporation. To obtain stockholder approval of the
scheme, Perskey issued statements describing the proposed action without disclosing the fact
that the $375,000 represented as assets did not exist.
131 520 F.2d at 287-88.
132 Id. at 288.
133 441 U.S. 768 (1979) (8-0 decision).
134 This scheme would have allowed Naftalin to purchase shares at the now lower market
price to cover his sell orders, thus reaping in profit the difference between his purchase price
and the price he "sold" the shares for when he placed the sell orders with brokers. Unfortu-
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that the evidence established fraud on the part of Naftalin in the con-
duct of these transactions, it vacated his conviction and held that section
17(a)(1) applies only to frauds injuring investors, not to those injuring
only brokers. 135 The Supreme Court reversed, in an 8-0 decision, find-
ing that Congress plainly intended section 17(a)(1) to apply to brokers
as well as to investors. The Court did not find persuasive the argument
that in this criminal case, a stricter standard must be applied to Nafta-
lin's benefit:
This is a criminal case, and we have long held that "ambiguity concerning
the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity,"...,
and that a defendant may not " 'be subjected to a penalty unless the words
of the statute plainly impose it.' ". . . In this case, however, the words of
the statute do "plainly impose it." Here, "Congress has conveyed its pur-
pose clearly, and we decline to manufacture ambiguity where none exists,"
136
It should be noted however, that this was not a close case, as Naftalin
admitted that he had defrauded the brokers who executed his sales by
falsely representing that he owned the stock he "sold." 137
Finally, in a similar action involving fraud in the sale of stock
which was prosecuted under Rule lOb-5, the Third Circuit held that the
Rule need not be applied more narrowly in a criminal lOb-5 prosecution
than it was applied in a civil action. In United States v. Peltz,138 defend-
ant Peltz was charged with violations of Rule lOb-5 for allegedly enter-
ing sell orders with brokers for stock which he falsely claimed to own.
Again, the Peltz court favored the policy of insuring the fair and efficient
operation of security markets over the policy that criminal statutes
should be construed narrowly in favor of the accused, or at least con-
strued more narrowly than civil iincarnations of the same statute.
The Second Circuit provided an answer to the vagueness attack on
Rule lOb-5 in the specific context of a criminal prosecution for insider
trading in United States v. Chiarella.139 This court, affirming the criminal
conviction of a financial printer for violation of Rule lOb-5, bluntly re-
jected the void-for-vagueness argument. In doing so, it held that under
Rule lOb-5, "[a]nyone--corporate insider or not-who regularly re-
ceives material nonpublic information may not use that information to
trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose." 40
nately for Naftalin, the market price of the shares he "sold" did not drop but in fact rose
sharply, leaving him unable to make covering purchases, and forcing the brokers to borrow
stock to keep their delivery promises.
135 441 U.S. at 771.
136 Id. at 778-79 (citations omitted).
137 Id. at 772.
138 433 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970).
139 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
140 Id. at 1365.
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This broad statement of liability under 10b-5 for insider trading
grew out of facts which plainly evidenced chicanery of one form or an-
other.141 The court of appeals seized on this chicanery to create its
broad standard of liability for trading on material nonpublic informa-
tion without prior disclosure.142 The Second Circuit was unpersuaded
by Chiarella's argument that imposition of a Rule lOb-5 duty to disclose
on one other than a traditional corporate insider was "so novel a con-
struction of the Rule as to violate the fair notice element of due pro-
cess."' 143 "That no prior litigated case has involved the precise fact
pattern at issue" 144 was not dispositive as long as "'a clear and definite
statement of the conduct proscribed' "145 antedates the criminal act.
The court found this clear and definite statement in two ways. First, the
court relied on a civil action brought by the Commission in 1974, en-
joining various employees of Sorg Printing Co. from trading on informa-
tion revealed through their employment activities. 146 Second, the court
relied upon signs posted by Chiarella's employer throughout the work-
141 Chiarella worked in the composing room of the New York office of a financial printer.
In the course of his duties, which involved the selection of type fonts and page layouts,
Chiarella handled the raw material for the announcement of five corporate takeover bids. To
preserve the confidentiality of the corporations involved in the bids, the identities of the ac-
quiring and target corporations were concealed in the copy sent to the printer through the use
of blank spaces or false names. During the final press run, on the night before release of the
takeover bid, the true names were inserted. Chiarella, "no ordinary printer, but a knowledge-
able stock trader who spoke with his broker as many as ten or fifteen times a day," id. at 1363,
was able to draw on other information contained in the documents to deduce, prior to the
date of this final printing, the names of the target corporations. Knowing the identity of the
targets, Chiarella would purchase shares in the target companies and then sell quickly after
announcement of the takeover bid, reaping substantial profits. These profits amounted to
over $30,000 in the course of some 14 months and 5 takeover bids. The Commission insti-
tuted an investigation of Chiarella's activities, which eventually resulted in the criminal in-
dictment of Chiarella on 17 counts of violating § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. These facts are set
out in detail at 588 F.2d at 1363-64 and 445 U.S. 222 at 224-25.
142 588 F.2d at 1363.
143 Id. at 1369.
144 Id.
145 Id. (quoting United States v. Perskey, 520 F.2d 283, 288 (2d Cir., 1975)).
146 SEC v. Sorg Printing Co., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,034
(S.D.N.Y. March 28, 1975). The conduct of the individual defendants in this action, who
were employees of Sorg, another financial printer, was conduct identical to that of Chiarella.
The individual defendants in this civil action consented to the entry of a preliminary injunc-
tion to prevent further trading in the shares of tender offerees by Sorg employees, thus limit-
ing the precedential value of this proceeding. Chiarella was the first individual prosecuted
under Rule 10b-5 for his conduct. After Sorg, only civil proceedings had been brought against
similarly situated printers who engaged in conduct almost identical to that of Chiarella. See
SEC v. Mandarano [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCIH) 95,357 (D.N.J. March
22, 1978) (defendants consented to entry of final judgment and permanent injunctions, as
well as disgorging profits derived from their activity); SEC v. Primar Typographers, Inc.
[1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 90,734 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (defendants
consented to the entry of final judgement and permanent injunctions, without admitting or
denying the allegations set out in the complaint); SEC v. Ayoub [1975-76 Transfer Binder]
1982]
COMMENTS [Vol. 73
place which notified employees that trading on information contained
in customers' copy could violate the securities laws and subject them to
criminal penalties. 147 These signs provided "explicit warning of the con-
sequences of. . .[Chiarella's] conduct." 48 The court found that these
signs provided a high degree of notice, particularly because Chiarella
"admitted passing the sign at least 640 times." 149
In a dissenting opinion,'50 Judge Meskill accepted Chiarella's no-
tice argument, particularly in light of the inability of the above two
factors to provide the degree of notice traditionally demanded of criminal
statutes. Judge Meskill noted that the court's application of 10b-5 to the
conduct in question was a clear expansion of prior law,' 5 ' since the ma-
jority had created a new category of market insider. Insiders now in-
cluded persons who were without a special relationship to a company
and were not privy to its internal affairs. 152 These persons had previ-
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,567 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (complaint only, SEC seeking a prelimi-
nary injunction).
Although the four cases cited above involve activity identical in most respects to that of
Chiarella, they are all civil cases and were all settled by the entry of consent decrees or prelim-
inary injunctions. These factors did not deter the Second Circuit from citing them in support
of its notice analysis. See United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1369 n. 17 (2d Cir. 1978).
147 The 8" X 10" signs, posted by Chiarella's employer, read as follows:
TO ALL EMPLOYEES:
The information contained in all type set and printing done by Pandick Press, Inc.,
is the private and personal property of the customer.
You are forbidden to use any information learned from customer's copy, proofs or
printed jobs for your own or anyone else's benefits, friend or family or talking about it
except to give or receive instructions. Any violation of this rule will result in your being
fired immediately and without warning.
In addition, you are liable to criminal penalties of 5 years in jail and $10,000 fine for
each offense.
Ifyou see or hear of anybody violating this, report it immediately to your supervisor
or to Mr. Green or Mr. Fertig. Failure to report violations will result in your being fired.
588 F.2d at 1369.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 1373 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
151 Id. The law prior to the Chiarella case specifically rejected the imposition of liability on
such nontraditional insiders, according to Meskill:
In General Tne Corp. v. Taly Induarries, Inc., . .. ., this court rejected a claim that a
company acquiring stock in another corporation must disclose to selling shareholders
plans for an eventual merger:
"We know of no rule of law, applicable at the time, that a purchaser of stock, who was
not an "insider" and had no fiduciary relation to a prospective seller, had any obligation
to reveal circumstances that might raise a seller's demands and thus abort the sale."
Id. at 1373 (quoting General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969)).
152 The dissent quoted from Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912, which defined the
central task established by lOb-5 to be the identification of "those persons who are in a special
relationship with a company and privy to its internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative
duties in trading its securities." 588 F.2d at 1374 (Meskill, J., dissenting) (emphasis in origi-
nal deleted).
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ously been under no duty to disclose information to the sellers of
stock. 153 The majority's broad reading of Rule 10b-5 did not provide a
"clear and definite statement of the conduct proscribed" prior to the
actions alleged to be criminal.' 54 Adopting the traditional notice-due
process analysis, Judge Meskill noted that such a "clear and definite
statement," in order to pass the notice test, "must emanate from the
language of the statute itself, from prior judicial interpretation or from
established usage."' 5 5 Thus, warning signs posted by Chiarella's em-
ployer were irrelevant to the issue of notice. Such signs could not trans-
form conduct not otherwise proscribed into conduct proscribed by that
statute. 156 Since the statutory language of Rule 10b-5 did not proscribe
Chiarella's conduct and no precedent extended the Rule to reach such
conduct, a sufficiently clear statement prohibiting Chiarella's conduct
did not exist which would permit the imposition of the criminal
sanction. 157
While Judge Meskill's dissent provided the first rigorous applica-
tion of the notice-due process doctrine to a prosecution of insider trading
under 10b-5, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals without
explicitly adopting the notice analysis of the dissent. The Court in
Chiarella v. United States 158 held that a duty to disclose under section
10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic informa-
tion, 59 and therefore, in the absence of such a duty, the Court over-
turned the conviction of Chiarella. 60 In overturning the conviction,
153 588 F.2d at 1375 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 1376-77.
155 Id. at 1377.
156 Id. Cf Bouje v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) (convictions under trespassing
statute held void-for-vagueness). In Bouie, the Court rejected a contention that defendants
were provided adequate notice of a trespass violation because a chain with a 'no trespassing'
sign attached had been placed on the premises by the owner of the restaurant where the
alleged violation took place: "[t]he determination whether a criminal statute provides fair
warning of its prohibitions must be made on the basis of that statute itself and the other
pertinent law, rather than on the basis of an ad hoc appraisal of the subjective expectations of
particular defendants." Id. at 347-48.
157 588 F.2d at 1377 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
158 445 U.S. 222.
159 Id. at 235.
160 The Court reached this conclusion by focusing upon the relationship which has tradi-
tionally given rise to this duty to disclose. While noting the broad, remedial nature of§ 10(b)
and of Rule lOb-5, the Court made clear that the affirmative duty to disclose material infor-
mation which "has been traditionally imposed on corporate insiders; particular officers, direc-
tors or controlling stockholders," id. at 227 (quoting Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 911),
arises from "(i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended
to be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate
insider to take advantage of that information by trading without disclosure." Id. While such
an obligation to disclose as between a corporate insider and the stockholders of his corpora-
tion is not novel, noted the Court, one who fails to disclose material information prior to the
sale or purchase of securities commits fraud only when he is under a dupi to disclose. Id. Such
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however, the Court made clear that it was not deciding (1) whether
Chiarella breached a duty to the acquiring corporation by virtue of his
position as an employee of the printer doing the printing for that corpo-
ration, (2) whether such a duty exists, and (3) whether such a breach
might constitue a violation of section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.161 By con-
cluding its opinion with this caveat, 162 the possibility is left open for
criminal proceedings against nontraditional insiders such as Chiarella
where a duty to an entity or to a person other than the seller of securities
is alleged in the indictment.
While this series of cases illustrates the willingness of the federal
courts to reject due process attacks in the context of Rule 10b-5 criminal
prosecutions, it does little to illuminate precisely why the rule, in its
broadest application, should be impervious to constitutional challenge.
While Chamay stands for the proposition that precedents established on
a duty arises only where one party has information the other is entitled to prior to entering
the transaction because of a fiduciary or similar confidential relationship running between the
two. Id. Although the Court did accept the broad judicial and administrative interpretations
of Rule lOb-5 creating liability for insider trading, it emphasized that such liability is contin-
gent upon a duty to disclose arising out of a relationship of trust between the parties involved
in the transaction:
[A]dministrative and judicial interpretations have established that silence in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities may operate as a fraud actionable under § 10(b)
despite the absence of statutory language or legislative history specifically addressing the
legality of nondisclosure. But such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising
from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction. Application
of a duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an
obligation to place shareholders' welfare before their own, will not benefit personally
through fraudulent use of material nonpublic information.
Id. In the instant case, because Chiarella was neither a corporate insider nor a recipient of
confidential information of the target company, the Court could not find such a duty "with-
out recognizing a general duty between all participants in market transactions to forego ac-
tions based on material, nonpublic information." Id. at 233. Unwilling to adopt such a
broad duty in the face of traditional doctrine that a duty to disclose arises out of a specific
relationship between the two parties, the Court reversed. Id.
161 Id. at 235-37.
162 Despite this caveat, the Court does adopt language which is reminiscent of that of a
notice-due process analysis without explicitly using that label:
[T]he 1934 Act cannot be read "more broadly than its language and the statutory
scheme reasonably permit.". . . . Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catch-all provi-
sion, but what it catches must be fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based upon
nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak. We hold that a duty to
disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market infor-
mation. The contrary result is without support in the legislative history of § 10(b) and
would be inconsistent with the careful plan that Congress has enacted for regulation of
the securities markets.
Id. at 234-35 (citations omitted).
Additionally, a judicial holding that certain undefined activities "generally are prohib-
ited by § 10(b) would raise questions whether either criminal or civil defendants would
be given fair notice that they have engaged in illegal activity. . ..
It is worth noting that this is apparently the first case in which criminal liability has
been imposed upon a purchaser for § 10(b) nondisclosure.
Id. at 235 n.20 (citations omitted).
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the civil side of Rule 10b-5 are equally applicable in criminal prosecu-
tions under the Rule, it does not explain why these precedents should be
equally applicable. Perskey stands for the proposition that plainly fraud-
ulent activity can be reached, even in a criminal prosecution, by a stat-
ute that might be subject to vagueness attacks in less compelling cases.
Yet, the factors which determine when the fraud is so compelling that it
overrides constitutional concerns of due process are left for other courts
to define. While the Supreme Court in Chiare/la refused to permit the
criminal conviction of a nontraditional insider for his violation of Rule
lOb-5's proscription against insider trading, the Court, in choosing not
to reach the constitutional question, left intact the traditional view of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as broad, remedial provisions capable of
proscribing insider trading in both the civil and criminal contexts. Be-
cause none of the cases discussed above actually reaches the question of
when the concern for fair and efficient securities markets requires that
constitutional notions of due process be disregarded in criminal prosecu-
tions of insider trading under Rule lOb-5, the remaining two sections of
this comment formally balance the philosophy of due process and the
concept of notice in criminal cases with the concern for fair and efficient
securities markets. This analysis will illustrate why, given the philoso-
phy of due proces and given the policy arguments in favor of more defi-
nite proscriptions of insider trading, the use of Rule 10b-5 in criminal
prosecutions of insider trading should cease.' 63
IV. THE SH.4W ANALOGY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF DUE PROCESS
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are traditionally viewed as broad,
remedial provisions whose breadth permits the courts, without prior
criminal precedent, "to find an indictable offense when it is necessary to
do so 'to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets.' ',164 A
163 Subsequent to the decision in Chiarella, the SEC adopted Rule 14e-3 to deal with "in-
sider" trading in the context of a tender offer, and to fill the gap in the law left by Chiarella.
See SEC Securities Act Release No. 6239 (Sept. 4, 1980) [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 82,646. The rule, in its basic substantive provisions, requires a person who
possesses nonpublic information relating to a tender offer either to disclose that information
prior to purchase or sale of any relevant securities or to abstain from trading entirely. See 45
Fed. Reg. 60,410 (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-3). The provision took effect October
14, 1980. While a step in the direction of definiteness in the context of insider trading during
the course of a tender offer, the provision does nothing to deal with insider trading in the
context of the ordinary purchase and sale. Such conduct is still subject to the vague proscrip-
tion of Rule 1Ob-5. Presumably, the SEC might still bring a prosecution for insider trading in
the context of a tender offer under Rule 10b-5 when the provisions of Rule 14e-3 prove too
rigid to encompass a particular violation. Rule 14e-3, then, has merely supplemented, not
supplanted, the provisions of Rule IOb-5. See generaly Note, Trading on Material, Nonpublic Infor-
mation Under Rule lle-3, 49 Gao. WASH. L. REy. 539 (1981).
164 United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d at 356.
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striking similarity exists between this traditional view of section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 and the approach taken in the English case of Shaw v.
Director ofPubh'c Prosecutions'65 in order to find an indictable offense when
necessary to protect public morals. Both the approach taken in Shaw
and the view adopted by the courts of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
amount to an assertion of a residual power to use vague policy concerns
to justify the proscription of conduct never before reached by the crimi-
nal law.' 66 Assessing the flaws inherent in the Shaw approach and com-
paring that approach with that adopted in criminal prosecutions under
10b-5 will demonstrate the inconsistency between the philosophy of due
process and the practical application of Rule 10b-5 as a criminal insider
trading provision as well as show the blatant unconstitutionality of such
an application of the rule.
Shaw was charged with the crime of conspiring to corrupt the pub-
lic morals by his publication of a booklet entitled the "Ladies Direc-
tory." The directory was a list of names and addresses of local female
prostitutes, who had paid Shaw for the inclusion of their names in the
booklet. Shaw was convicted by a jury in the Central Criminal Court
following a charge by the judge that a conspiracy to corrupt the public
morals was a common law misdemeanor. The House of Lords sustained
the conviction. Both Viscount Simonds and Lord Tucker, writing for
the majority, concluded that the absence of exact precedent did not bar
a conviction for conspiracy to corrupt public morals.167 The lower ap-
peals court, the Court of Criminal Appeal, had drawn a distinction be-
tween creating a new offense and "applying existing law to new
facts,"e 8 and argued that, in convicting Shaw, the trial court was doing
the latter rather than creating new law. 169 Viscount Simonds did not
explicitly adopt this distinction; rather, he spoke of a residual power in
the courts to create new offenses where necessary to protect public
morals:
165 [1961] 2 All E.R. 446.
166 This comparison between the approach taken in Sham and that taken with regard to
Rule lOb-5 was suggested by Judge Sneed in his concurring opinion in United States v.
Charnay, 537 F.2d at 356 (Sneed, J., concurring) (footnote omitted):
The resemblance from an analytic viewpoint between our approach and that employed
in Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 2 A.E.R. 452 [sic.] (1961), where the House of
Lords recognized that the common law crime of corrupting public morals requires a
residual power to proscribe unanticipated wickedness contra bonos mores, strikes me as dis-
turbingly close. To protect and preserve honest markets we assert the residual power
derived from a broad statute and rule to proscribe conduct surrounding a corporate
takeover never here to fore branded improper by judicial decision, Commission rule or
determination, or explicit Congressional act.
167 See Brownlie & Williams, Judiial Legislation in Criminal Law, 42 CAN. BAR. REv. 561,
596 (1964).
168 R. v. Shaw, [1961] 1 All E.R. 330, 338 (Crim. App.).
169 Id.
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In the sphere of criminal law. . . , there remains in the courts of law a
residual power. . . to conserve not only the safety and order but also the
moral welfare of the state, and it is their duty to guard it against attacks
which may be the more insidious because they are novel and unprepared
for. . . . T)here is. . . a residual power, where no statute has yet inter-
vened to supersede the common law, to superintend those offences which
are prejudicial to the public welfare. 170
Thus, the Shaw court asserted a power, originally wielded by the Star
Chamber, 171 which enabled it to proscribe any activity prejudicial to
the public welfare, even where no statute or continued common law
practice proscribed such conduct.
In his dissent, Lord Reid criticized this broad view of the authority
of the court to proscribe conduct under its power as custos morum. He
argued that convicting Shaw for conspiring to corrupt public morals
amounted to the imposition of a criminal penalty for conduct which
prior to Shaw's acts had not been a crime. 172 Thus, conduct not crimi-
nal on previous authority became so simply by judicial fiat. While such
a power to create new criminal offenses may have been beneficial in the
days when Parliament seldom met, Lord Reid concluded that today it is
the province of the legislature and not of the judiciary to create new
offenses. 173 Lord Reid noted' 74 that permitting a court to create new
criminal offenses deprives the individual of the right to notice and, thus,
170 [1961] 2 All E.R. 446, 452 (Viscount Simonds).
171 See Brownlie & Williams, supra note 167, at 567.
172 Lord Reid wrote:
[I]n order to extend this offence [conspiracy] to a new field, the court would have to
create a new unlawful act; it would have to hold that conduct of a kind which has not
hitherto been unlawful in this sense must now be held to be unlawful. It appears to me
that the objections to that arejust as powerful as the objections to creating a new offence.
The difference is a matter of words; the essence of the matter is that a type of conduct for
the punishment of which there is no previous authority now for the first time becomes
punishable solely by a decision of a court.
[1961] 2 All E.R. 446, 453 (Lord Reid, dissenting).
173 Id. (quoting R. v. Newland, [1953] 2 All E.R. 1067, 1072-73).
174 Lord Reid argues that:
[i]t has always been thought to be of primary importance that our law, and particularly
our criminal law, should be certain; that a man should be able to know what conduct is
and what is not criminal, particularly when heavy penalties are involved. Some sugges-
tion was made that it does not matter if this offence is very wide; no one would ever
prosecute and if they did no jury would ever convict if the breach was venial. . . . In
other words, you cannot tell what is criminal except by guessing what view a jury will
take, and juries' views may vary and change with the passing of time.. . . If the trial
judge's charge in the present case was right, if a jury is entitled to water down the strong
words "deprave," "corrupt" or "debauch" so as merely to mean lead astray morally,
then it seems to me that the court has transferred to the jury the whole of its functions as
censor morum, and this branch of the law will have lost all the certainty which we




of his ability to use the law as a guide for future conduct. 175
Under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, any conduct is punishable if it
interferes with the maintenance of fair and honest markets and can be
classified as a manipulative activity or as a deceptive device. Thus, the
concept of "fair and honest markets" in the Securities Exchange Act is
the functional equivalent of the concept of "custos morm" as employed in
Shaw to create a crime where none previously existed. 176 The language
of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 does not proscribe insider trading, but
expansive judicial and administrative determinations in civil cases 177
which extend 1Ob-5 liability to reach insider trading have made that
activity a crime. The Second Circuit opinion in Chiarella demonstrates
how this approach totally disregards the fundamentals of notice and due
process. Despite the lack of any civil or criminal precedent imposing
liability under Rule 1Ob-5 on a purchaser in Chiarella's position, the
court found the imposition of criminal liability consistent with the pol-
icy of ensuring a "fair and honest" securities market. The extent to
which the court relied on this broad policy to impose 1Ob-5 liability
upon Chiarella is evident in the first three sentences of the opinion:
The draftsmen of our nation's securities laws, rejecting the philosophy of
caveat emptor, created a system providing equal access to the information
necessary for reasoned and intelligent investment decisions. It is apodictic
that betting on a "sure thing" is anathema to the ideal of "fair and honest
markets" established as the foundation of this statutory edifice. Thepresent
case requires us to appy these principles in the context of a criminal prosecution for
trading on advance knowledge of stock market events. 178
Under this approach, a court may convict for the crime of "insider trad-
ing," even where previously unproscribed, if it finds that such trading is
"anathema to the ideal of fair and honest markets." Still intact after
Chiarella is the philosophy that expansive holdings in the context of civil
175 Further critcism of the majority's approach in Shaw came from H.L.A. Hart, who dis-
cussed the rejection of the concept of fair notice:
The judges [in Shaw] seemed willing to pay a high price in terms of the sacrifice of other
values for the establishment--or re-establishment--of the Courts as castos mornu. The
particular value which they sacrificed is the principle of legality which requires criminal
offences to be as precisely defined as possible, so that it can be known with reasonable
certainty beforehand what acts are criminal and what are not.
H. HART, LAw, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 12 (1962).
176 See note 121 supra.
177 As Justice Rehnquist observed:
When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak which
has grown from little more than a legislative acorn. Such a growth may be quite consis-
tent with the congressional enactment and the role of the federal judiciary in interpret-
ing it,. . . , but it would be disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in 1934 or the
Securities and Exchange Commission in 1942 foreordained the present state of the law
with respect to Rule 10b-5.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 41 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
178 588 F.2d at 1362 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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10b-5 cases can be applied in criminal lOb-5 prosecutions when neces-
sary to preserve the operation of fair and honest markets. Such an ap-
proach is anathema to the due process concept of notice.
V. EFFICIENCY AND THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE CRIMINAL
APPROACH TO INSIDER TRADING UNDER RULE lOb-5
While due process demands that criminal sanctions be eliminated
from the proscription of insider trading, several arguments illustrating
the inefficiency of criminal prosecutions of insider trading under Rule
10b-5 support the same demand. When a provision meets the require-
ments of notice by specifically proscribing insider trading and reaches
conduct that may impair the fair operation of securities markets, it is
inefficient to continue to rely on the vague provisions of Rule 10b-5 to
proscribe insider trading. The specific provision which satisfies due pro-
cess and protects efficient securities markets is section 1603 of the ALI's
proposed Federal Securities Code. 179 The provision specifically attacks
the problem of insider trading and, unlike section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
does not purport to be a general antifraud provision.' 80 The proposed
179 ALl FED. SECURrrIEs CODE § 1603 (1980):
INSIDERS' DUTY TO DISCLOSE WHEN TRADING
SEC. 1603. (a) GENERAL.-It is unlawful for an insider to sell or buy a security of
the issuer, if he knows a fact of special significance with respect to the issuer or the
security that is not generally available, unless (1) the insider reasonably believes that the
fact is generally available, or (2) the identity of the other party to the transaction (or his
agent) is known to the insider and (A) the insider reasonably believes that that party (or
his agent) knows the fact, or (B) that party (or his agent) knows the fact from the insider
or otherwise.
(b) INSIDER.-For purposes of section 1603, "insider" means (1) the issuer, (2) a
director or officer of, or a person controlling, controlled by, or under common control
with, the issuer, (3) a person who, by virtue of his relationship or former relationship to
the issuer, knows a fact of special significance about the issuer or the security in question
that is not generally available, or (4) a person who learns such a fact from a person
within section 1603(b) (including a person within section 1603(b)(4)) with knowledge
that the person from whom he learns the fact is such a person, unless the Commission or
a court finds that it would be inequitable, on consideration of the circumstances and the
purposes of this Code (including the deterrent effect of liability), to treat the person
within section 1603(b) (4) as if he were within section 1603(b) (1), (2), or (3).
Id.
180 Section 1603 deals specifically with insider trading. Fraud and misrepresentation as
encountered in its more conventional forms in securities transactions is proscribed by section
1602(a)(1). Section 1602(a)(1) provides that "(i)t is unlawful for any person to engage in a
fraudulent act or to make a misrepresentation in connection with (1) a sale or purchase of a
security, an offer to sell or buy a security, or an inducement not to buy or sell a security
... " ALI FED. SECURITIES CODE § 1602(a)(1) (1980). The proposed code thus recognized
the inherent problems of proscribing specific conduct, insider trading, in the context of a
general statute designed to reach more conventional fraud in the purchase or sale of securities.
The recognition of these problems has to date eluded the courts and the SEC as they continue




statute provides, subject to limited exceptions, 8 1 that "it is unlawful for
an insider to sell or buy a security of the issuer, if he knows a fact of
special significance with respect to the issuer or the security that is not
generally available .... 182 After this substantive proscription of in-
sider trading, the statute explicitly defines what constitutes an "insider"
for purposes of the proscription.' 8 3 This definition does not include
"quasi-insiders" with no relationship to the issuer, such as the printer in
Chiarella v. United States 184 because the drafters of the statute recognized
the inherent notice problems presented by including all potential quasi-
insiders. 18 5 The drafters noted that "quasi-insiders" constitute a cate-
gory of traders that inherently "does not lend itself to definition."'186
The drafters solved the definitional problem by restricting section 1603
to quasi-insiders who have or previously have had a relationship to the
issuer, 87 leaving the general antifraud provision of section 1602(a) (1) to
reach egregious conduct that does not lend itself to the traditional in-
sider analysis of section 1602.188 Given the specificity of this proposed
statute, the absence of any vagueness or notice problems, and its ability
to proscribe all forms of deception that can fairly be labeled as insider
trading, it is not surprising that even the SEC has recommended adop-
tion of the statute by Congress.L89
181 Id. § 1603(a)(1), (2). Essentially, the rule imposes liability unless the insider reasonably
believes that the significant fact has been disclosed, either to the public in general or to his
specific trading partner.
182 Id. § 1603(a).
183 Id. § 1603(b).
184 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
185 See ALI FED. SECURITIES CODE 663 (1980) (Comment (3)(d)).
186 id. The drafters note the following:
It would be convenient to have a new category of "quasi-insider" that would cover peo-
ple like (i) judges' clerks who trade on information in unpublished opinions, (ii) Federal
Reserve Bank employees who trade with knowledge of an imminent change in the mar-
gin rate ...
But all this does not lend itself to definition. It is difficult in the abstract to opine even
on illustrative cases. Where, for example, would one place the outsider who is about to
make a tender offer? In Chiarela the court recognized that X13(d) had been construed to
permit a would-be tender offerer to buy up to five percent of its prospective target with
no disclosure at all. But what about his "tippee"--perhaps his depository bank?
Id.
187 Id. § 1603(b)(3).
188 Id. § 1602(a)(1). The drafters explain that "to the extent that a sufficiently egregious or
shocking or offensive case of trading while silent cannot be rationalized on an 'insider' analysis,
a plaintiff may fall back on § 1602(a)(1). It must be immediately added that not every case of
an outsider's trading without disclosure of a material fact is a 'fraudulent act.' " Id. at 663
(comment 3(d)).
189 SEC Securities Act Releases No. 6242 (Sept. 18, 1980), [1980 Transfer Binder] FED.
SE. L. REP. (CCH) 82,655. The Commission recommended adoption of the entire Federal
Securities Code with only minor revisions. In arguing for the adoption of the proposed code,
the Commission recognized the lack of predictability and certainty of the current law: "en-
actments of this proposal would, on the whole, promote greater predictability and certainty
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Rule lOb-5's inherent inability to provide adequate notice leads to
the deterrence of legitimate trading activities. Such overdeterrence casts
doubt on the efficiency of the rule to protect the fair operation of securi-
ties markets. In an environment of indeterminate liability created by
vague standards, business activity may not be conducted at all if the
expected liability is sufficiently great to deter any activity. 190 Therefore,
in establishing a vague standard, regulators run the risk of deterring not
only the conduct intended to be proscribed, but also of detering legiti-
mate business activity. This effect is particularly visible in the modern
business environment where a fine line often exists between aggressive
but legitimate business activity and activity that is illegitimate. 191 Seri-
ous attempts to comply with the rule laid down by a vague regulatory
scheme might actually result in the curtailment of activity which in eco-
nomic terms is desirable and necessary for the efficient operation of the
securities markets. This problem is particularly acute where the fear of
criminal prosecution is an effective deterrent to crime, 192 because the
fear such sanctions generate deters legitimate activity.193
in the interpretation of the federal securities laws and would, thus, promote investor protec-
tion, the integrity of our Nation's securities markets, and the capital formation process." Id.
Little is left to be said for Rule lOb-5 in the context of prosecutions for insider trading when,
as the SEC itself notes, the same goals of protection of the investor and protection of the
securities markets can be met by a more certain, and certainly constitutional, statute.
190 Judge Cardozo made the following observation concerning "liability in an indetermi-
nate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class: (t)he hazards of business
conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in
the implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences." 255 N.Y. 170, 179-80, 174 N.E.
441, 444 (1931).
191 As argued by Kadish,
the behavior under discussion involves restraints upon the free operation of business
without at the same time denying commitment to a free enterprise system. The demar-
cation of the line between the legitimate, indeed the affirmatively desireable, and illegiti-
mate in business conduct is continually in flux and subject to wide controversy in the
community.
Kadish, Criminal Sanctions for Economic Regulations, supra note 3, at 446.
192 "[S]evere punishments ... may be footless in preventing crimes of passion. But when
the question is one of urging the great well-meaning public into conduct which happens to be
slightly inconvenient, severe punishments in the offing--known to be in the offing--are capa-
ble of effect." Bell & Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic
Legislation: A Sodological View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 216 n.64 (1965) (quoting LLEWELLYN,
JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 403-04 (1962)).
193 The Supreme Court identified the problem in the context of a criminal prosecution for
Sherman Act violations. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422
(1978). The Court noted that:
the behavior proscribed by the Act is often difficult to distinguish from the gray zone of
socially acceptable and economically justifiable business conduct. Indeed, the type of
conduct charged in the indictment in this case--the exchange of price information
among competitors-is illustrative in this regard. The imposition of criminal liability on
a corporate official, or for that matter on a corporation directly, for engaging in such
conduct which only after the fact is determined to violate the statute because of anti-
competitive effects, without inquiring into the intent with which it was undertaken,
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This concept of overdeterrence is particularly relevant in the con-
text of 1Ob-5's proscription of insider trading. Professor Bromberg notes
that Rule 10b-5 permits trading on information that either has not yet
developed to the level of materiality or has been made public through
disclosure.1 94 Yet he cautions that "[d]ifficulties in identifying these
points, especially the former one [materiality], suggest a good deal of
self-restraint by those who want to be sure they steer clear of 10b-5."' 19 5
The Supreme Court, recognizing the potential seriousness of overdeter-
rence in the realm of economic regulation, has required a higher degree
of notice in some regulatory schemes. 196 Unfortunately, it has not done
this for Rule 10b-5's proscription of insider trading. Thus, given their
potential for deterring legitimate trading activities, criminal penalties
for insider trading under Rule 10b-5 are an inefficient and undesirable
sanction.
The availability of broad civil liability to deter fraudulent insider
trading 97 and the restricted use of the criminal sanction' 98 throughout
the history of Rule 1 Ob-5 199 makes undesirable the vesting of vast discre-
tion in the Commission to determine when to employ the criminal sanc-
tion. The wide array of other sanctions available under the Securities
Exchange Act, including private actions, injunctive actions and mone-
tary settlements makes the criminal sanction a last resort which is used
selectively, though not with certainty, in the more blatantly fraudulent
cases.200 The availability of both civil and criminal sanctions vests a
high degree of discretion in the Commission and the Justice Depart-
holds out the distinct possibility of overdeterrence; salutary and procompetive conduct
lying close to the borderline of impermissible conduct might be shunned by businessmen
who chose to be excessively cautious in the face of uncertainty regarding possible expo-
sure to criminal punishment for even a good-faith error of judgment.
Id. at 440-41 (footnotes omitted).
194 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 14, § 7.4(6)(a), at 178 (1977).
195 Id. Bromberg refers to the difficulty of identifying points of materiality in the context
of civil liability. While difficulty in identifying the point of materiality may "suggest a good-
deal of self restraint" in order to avoid civil liability, there are even greater incentives for one
not to trade where the threat of criminal sanctions is present.
196 See Note, Due Process Requirements ofDefiniteness 'n Stautes, supra note 85, at 86. The note
cites Weeds, Inc. v. United States, 255 U.S. 109 (1921), and United States v. L. Cohen Gro-
cery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
197 Herlands, supra note 77, at 196.
198 The restricted use of the criminal sanction in the context of Rule lOb-5 is due in part to
the general difficulties encountered by the prosecution in criminal proceedings. The tradi-
tional safeguards of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, trial by jury, and other forms of protec-
tion combine to make the process too cumbersome for large-scale enforcement. See Bell &
Friedman, supra note 182, at 214. ("The criminal sanctions remain as threats--they are
"used" in the sense of being authorized, but no longer "used" in the sense of wholesale appli-
cation to offenders.").
199 See note 76 supra.
200 Herlands, supra note 77, at 196-197.
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ment, 20 1 which must decide whether to prosecute the action on behalf of
the Commission.2 0 2 Thus, two decisions must be made by two different
enforcement authorities. The Commission must first decide whether to
proceed with any sanction and then must decide whether to proceed
civilly or criminally. If the decision is made to proceed criminally, the
Attorney General makes the final decision to prosecute or to drop the
proceedings. The vast amounts of discretion 20 3 exercised in this process
mean that "the fate of the violator hinges not only upon the pertinent
law, but also upon the individual determination of subjective issues by
both administrative and prosecutorial officials. ' 20 4 This result is graphi-
cally illustrated in the Chiardla case, where Chiarella was prosecuted for
a criminal violation of 10b-5 when his conduct was virtually identical to
that which had brought only civil sanctions in previous cases.20 5 The
existence of such vast discretion in the context of a vague statute argues
for a more definite and certain statute which would indicate the clear
limits of prosecutorial discretion in the context of insider trading.
VI. CONCLUSION
When the three practical problems discussed above are considered
in the context of the general theoretical problems of notice, considerable
doubt is cast on the validity of the criminal application of Rule 10b-5 to
insider trading. Rule 10b-5 developed as an insider trading rule
through judicial interpretation and expansion in civil cases. This devel-
opment limits the ability of the Rule to provide adequate constitutional
notice of exactly what behavior is subject to criminal sanction. This
pattern of development has also led to the Rule's application, contrary
to the principles of due process and notice, in criminal prosecutions.
The Rule has thus become the functional equivalent of a residual judi-
201 The Justice Department plays a key role in bringing a criminal action under the Secur-
ities Exchange Act. If the Commission thinks a criminal prosecution is warranted, it may
forward evidence to the Attorney General who will decide, in his discretion, whether to
prosecute:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or about to
engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of the provi-
sions of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation thereunder, it may in its discretion,
bring an action in the proper district court of the United States or United States courts
of any Territory, to enjoin such acts or practices and upon a proper showing a perma-
nent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond. The
Commission may transmit such evidence as may be available concerning such acts or
practices to the Attorney General, who may, in his discretion, institute the necessary
criminal proceedings under this chapter.
15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1976).
202 Se Developiments in the LaW-Corforate Cre. Regulating Corporate Behaior Through Crminal
Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1307 (1979).
203 Id. at 1308.
204 Id.
205 See note 146 & accompanying text supra.
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cial power to proscribe any insider trading that is deemed contrary to
the fair and efficient operation of the securities markets. Criminal pen-
alties make the Rule a potential deterrent of legitimate securities trans-
actions by insiders. The Commission, with the availability of criminal
sanctions, exercises vast discretion in enforcement of the Rule which is
potentially harmful to the regulatory scheme as well as unfair to individ-
ual defendants. A rule that cannot be applied constitutionally or effi-
ciently in criminal prosecutions has no place in the criminal law. While
few individuals may have suffered directly through criminal prosecu-
tions for insider trading violations of 10b-5, the legitimacy of the crimi-
nal sanction has been endangered by a rule designed with attention to
the demands of economic theory rather than to the demands of the
criminal law.206 The imprecision of economic theory has no place in a
criminal law in which certainty is a necessary prerequisite. For all these
reasons, the criminal prosecution of Rule lOb-5 insider trading viola-
tions should cease. If criminal prosecution is a necessary weapon in the
SEC's arsenal against insider trading, then that prosecution should be
brought under new statutory provisions which would codify the judicial
development of Rule 10b-5 to define the conduct proscribed.
DANIEL J. BACASTOW
206 See Herlands, suipra note 77, at 139.
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